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ARTICLES
JUDICIAL BACKLASH OR JUST BACKLASH?
EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT
David Fontana* and Donald Braman**
When the Supreme Court decides a controversial issue, does it generate
a distinctive public backlash? Or would a similar decision by Congress gener-
ate a similar reaction? Surprisingly, although these questions pervade de-
bates over constitutional law, little direct empirical research exists about this
question. Indeed, very little in the way of empirical research exists about
which institution citizens prefer to make a given constitutional decision, let
alone how citizens go about contemplating these issues. To help remedy this,
we conducted an experiment. Half of study subjects were assigned to a condi-
tion in which a constitutional right to gay marriage was protected, and the
other half were assigned to a condition in which a constitutional right to
carry a concealed weapon was protected. Half of each of those groups of sub-
jects was told that the Court, and the other half that Congress, had decided
the issue. We hypothesized that people develop beliefs about the competence of
institutions and generate preferences for institutions by assessing whether
that institution will reach a decision that supports or threatens their
worldview. We also hypothesized that citizens would become more extreme in
their beliefs about the underlying constitutional issue in reaction to a
Supreme Court decision. The study results support these hypotheses. Con-
ducted just prior to the midterm congressional elections in the fall of 2010,
the study also provided evidence of distinctive effects on voting intentions.
Our results complicate standard accounts of institutional choice that purport
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to rely on preferences independent of a particular outcome on controversial
constitutional matters. Our results also have important implications for gov-
ernment actors, advocates in social movements, and constitutional theorists.
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INTRODUCTION
These are important times at One First Street, N.E., in Washington
D.C. In these polarizing times, the Supreme Court of the United States
either has or possibly shortly will be issuing decisions on the leading po-
larizing issues of the day—health care, immigration, and gay marriage,
just to name a few. And each time a morning begins with news of a con-
troversial Court decision, the reaction will feature similar themes:
Supporters and opponents will react to the decision itself, but also to the
fact that the Court was the institution deciding the case. The country will
ask itself the same question Judge Vaughn Walker of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California asked himself at the
close of the recent gay marriage trial: Do Americans want courts deciding
these issues?1
In other words, is there a “countermajoritarian difficulty”2 pervading
the way we think about constitutional law, such that we respond differ-
ently to gay marriage being ordered by a court rather than by a legisla-
ture? This is the question of “backlash”: whether courts incur a special
form of public response for deciding leading issues of the day. It is an
important question, but one about which little direct empirical research
exists—until now.3
The implications of the answer to this question are substantial. For
scholars, those attracted to the Warren Court and its efforts to pursue an
almost idyllic version of the “forms of justice”4 would have a more diffi-
cult time justifying the Court doing precisely this if the public does not
want it. The cause might be just, but instead of advocating for the next
Chief Justice Earl Warren, it would be better to aim for House Speaker or
Senate Majority Leader Warren. Conversely, the recent trend toward pop-
ular constitutionalism and the argument that we should “take the
Constitution away from the courts”5 is made more difficult if the public
wants the courts to keep the Constitution all to themselves.
1. See Transcript of Proceedings at 3095, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW) (inquiring about danger that, “as in other areas
where the Supreme Court has ultimately constitutionalized something that touches upon
highly-sensitive social issues . . . the political forces that otherwise have been frustrated . . .
[may] plague our politics”). For further discussion of this statement, see Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (And After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 Yale L.J. 2028, 2030 (2011).
2. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 16 (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.”).
3. We have discussed the findings of our research for a more general audience in
David Fontana & Donald Braman, Supreme Anxiety, New Republic, Feb. 2, 2012, at 8.
4. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979)
(arguing Supreme Court has unique role to play in pursuing justice).
5. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, at ix–xii (1999)
(arguing for limiting constitutional decisions by courts).
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It is not just in the ivory tower that this question has substantial im-
portance. Measuring institutional preferences can tell us whether then-
Senator Barack Obama was right to say in The Audacity of Hope that “in our
reliance on the courts to vindicate not only our rights but also our values,
progressives had lost too much faith in democracy.”6 And if the new
Republican majority in the House of Representatives wants us to have a
narrower vision of the Constitution, a better understanding of public in-
stitutional preferences could guide Speaker John Boehner either to the
floor of the House or to the courtroom. This Article therefore asks an
important but heretofore unexamined question: Does it matter to members of
the public whether it is the Supreme Court or Congress deciding important constitu-
tional issues of the day?
We examined this question experimentally, utilizing a representative
national sample of American citizens questioned right before the hotly
contested midterm elections in November of 2010. The study focused on
an issue that liberals have pursued in the courts (gay marriage) and an
issue that conservatives have pursued in the courts (gun rights). Subjects
in the four conditions read news stories describing a recent decision by
the Supreme Court or Congress varying only the issue or the institution
deciding the issue (and the overwhelming majority of subjects believed
these stories had actually and recently transpired).7 We utilized an experi-
mental design because of its causal rigor, but also because it permits us to
see whether institutional preferences endure in the face of a recent and
salient constitutional development.
Rather than having institutional preferences in the way convention-
ally asserted, the public has contingent institutional preferences. The
public may or may not like it when the Court restrains majoritarian action
in the name of the Constitution or when Congress intervenes in constitu-
tional issues, but this is contingent on whether it likes or dislikes the va-
lence of the result commanded rather than a sense that the wrong institu-
tion is commanding the result. Because citizens disagree with one
another over many policy ends, there is likely to be significant variance in
beliefs about whether the Court or Congress was acting within its legiti-
mate purview in any particular case. This variance, we found, can be ex-
plained by whether a given citizen views the Court’s decision or
Congress’s legislation as threatening or privileging her core worldview.
We examined a range of possible ways in which that valence materializes,
meaning a range of different types of prior worldviews (“priors”) that
might be motivating one’s institutional preferences. For the core of our
findings and our discussion of its implications, it does not matter which
priors are driving individuals’ institutional preferences. But while we did
find that all of these types of priors have explanatory power, we found
6. Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American
Dream 83 (2006).
7. The news stories were fictional, and participants were debriefed after completing
the experiment.
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that cultural priors tend to explain more, and so we focus more on those
overall.
Part I sets out the debate about institutional preferences and ex-
plains the distinctive methodology we utilize to join this debate. Our ex-
perimental design tests the assumption that people care about institu-
tional choice in the face of polarizing conflicts. Part II sets out our
methodology and our research design and reports the results of our sur-
vey experiment. The results demonstrate that subjects’ priors explained
their responses to different institutional action, with some interesting in-
ternal variations, and with cultural priors showing the most significant
effects. This means that supporters of a decision favored the institution
supporting their priors more after the decision than before, and oppo-
nents of a decision favored the institution even less. Across the board, the
effect was more substantial the more one knew about the issue in ques-
tion. We found that neither the Court nor Congress changes net support
for the underlying constitutional issue it is deciding, but Court decisions
polarize public sentiments on constitutional issues more than congres-
sional acts. We also found that decisions by the Court shifted anticipated
electoral turnout more than decisions by Congress.
Part III discusses what these findings mean for key constituencies of
constitutional law. For the Supreme Court, it means that that there is at
least some reason to believe that the Court can pursue a constitutional
agenda without immediate and uniform backlash. Our data provide only
some evidence of a Court-specific backlash against the Court’s decision
because it is the Court. Nor was the balance of opinion regarding the
competence of the Court to decide such issues altered by the Court’s
decision. Although opponents became enraged, supporters of the contro-
versial decisions rallied behind a Court delivering them the constitutional
goods they so ardently desired. Advocates of an emboldened Court, how-
ever, should take note of more cautionary findings in the data. The
Court, although generating no shift in the balance of public opinion, did
generate significantly greater polarization than Congress. If our data sug-
gest the Court may be less constrained by concerns about backlash, they
should also generate concern about further embattling an already di-
vided public. There are caveats about this implication, but it is one worth
pursuing in greater detail.
For the public, our results suggest that, if priors affect institutional
preferences, it will be difficult to trigger a unifying public discussion
about the Court when it comes to controversial issues. We therefore dis-
cuss insights provided by existing research about how talking about an
issue—including the Court—in a more realistic and open fashion can
overcome existing biases.
For Congress, our results suggest that popular constitutionalism has
some empirical weight to it and that there are politically plausible paths
for Congress to assert a role in constitutional law. For social movements,
they suggest that arguments over which institution is the best institution
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 6  3-MAY-12 9:13
736 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:731
to enlist present a far more complex question than previously thought,
and one that will be almost impossible to disentangle from divided pre-
dictions about the results they produce—not only in disputes over consti-
tutional law, but also in the accompanying normative and political strug-
gles they reflect. For constitutional theorists, our results suggest that
there are some parts of our “obsession”8 with the countermajoritarian
difficulty and the role of the Court that need to be revisited because there
are many ways in which the public does not care deeply about this alleged
“difficulty.”
I. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the first week of most constitutional law classes, the question
arises9—and the question persists throughout the class, and dominates
the discussion about constitutional law in our classrooms, our scholar-
ship, our courtrooms, and our political debates: What is the proper role
of the Supreme Court in deciding what the Constitution means? There
are many types of arguments one can make in response to that question.
Some of these arguments are related to democratic or legal theory,10
some related to legalist considerations like constitutional history,11 text,12
or precedent,13 and some to pragmatic considerations like institutional
capacity14 or social structure.15 But another form of argument that both
8. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 159 (2002) [hereinafter
Friedman, Birth] (“The academic obsession with the countermajoritarian problem has
been with us for a long time.”).
9. Most of the time, the question derives from the discussion about Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Even for those who do not teach Marbury
in constitutional law, though, this question is still at the core of constitutional law. See
Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why
You Shouldn’t Either, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 553, 570 (2003) (arguing constitutional law is
about teaching that “the Constitution is, at the very least . . . what a variety of institutional
actors say it is”).
10. For notable recent examples of these arguments see generally Jeremy Waldron,
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006), and the response
by Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev.
1693 (2008).
11. See William E. Nelson, Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial
Review 54–71 (2000) (describing history of Marbury).
12. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not to),
115 Yale L.J. 2037 (2006) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A
Biography (2005)).
13. See David Strauss, The Living Constitution 36–49 (2010) (describing and
advocating courts’ common law approach to constitutional change).
14. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 22–25 (1977)
(“[I]f courts cannot do certain things well, other institutions may perform the same tasks
even less capably.”); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? 1–26 (2008) (“Uniquely situated, courts have the capacity to act where
other institutions are politically unwilling or structurally unable to proceed.”).
15. See generally Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights 13–21 (2004).
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stands alone and permeates many of these other types of argument is the
claim that the public has preferences about which branch of the govern-
ment should be deciding deeply contested questions.
As this Part discusses, important parts of our scholarly, legal, and po-
litical discussion about constitutional law either explicitly or logically pre-
sume that people have outcome-independent institutional preferences
when it comes to deciding constitutional issues. We divide the institu-
tional choice literature into two camps. First, many arguments about insti-
tutional choice hinge on differences in perceived competencies—that is,
these arguments regarding institutional choice focus on the capacities
and capabilities of the institutions broadly understood, concerns that are
ostensibly independent of a specific legal outcome. We highlight and
note the differences between competency-related concerns and the per-
ceived results the Court might tend to produce—the effects on politics that
an institution tends to produce because of the outputs this institution
produces may also motivate differential institutional preferences. The
first camp focuses on preferences for an institution simply because it is
that institution, while the second camp focuses on preferences for an in-
stitution because of a sense of the results that the institution tends to
produce.
It turns out, though, that the most closely related empirical literature
is poorly suited to answering either type of concern about institutional
choice. The existing literature focuses on dependent variables that are
only of indirect relevance to institutional preferences, or at least more
research is needed to prove their relevance (variables like “legitimacy” or
“approval”). This literature also includes research designs that prevent it
from being able to say anything about institutional choice in the face of
high political and cultural stakes. Our experimental design, as Part II will
discuss in greater detail, tries to accommodate this by both asking sub-
jects about useful variables in light of a decision (Which institution
should decide this issue? How do you feel about the underlying issue that
has been decided? How likely are you to vote in an upcoming election?)
and asking about these variables using polarizing and stimulating inde-
pendent variables.
A. Versions of Institutional Preferences
Arguments about institutional choice can be subdivided into at least
two types. The first focuses on the distinctive capacities or capabilities of
the Supreme Court and Congress, and this focus itself might trigger cer-
tain institutional preferences. Call these “preferences about perceived com-
petencies,” as they relate to the perception that one institution has distinc-
tive qualities that better suit it to making a decision on this kind of issue,
independent of any legal outcome. We mean “competencies” to cover a
broad range of forms of competencies, some more technical and practi-
cal and some more normative. We use this term to refer to some intrinsic
capacity or incapacity that an institution might possess, at whatever level
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(technical, practical, political, normative) that competency might exist.
What matters to those involved in debates over competencies of our law-
making institutions is that it is the Court or Congress (with their idiosyn-
cratic decisionmaking processes and capabilities within our democratic
structure) making the law, not the law that is made. If Congress produced
the same form of outcome, according to the competencies approach, the
public sentiment would be different because it is something about the
perceived intrinsic competency of an institution triggering preferences.
The intense and important scholarly debate about backlash enters in
here: Backlash becomes the way of describing how competency violations
are enforced. The public has a sense of which institution is more or less
competent, and if that sense is violated then backlash ensues.
The second type of institutional preference focuses on the various
shifts in norms and politics that the institutions can produce. Call these
preferences about perceived results, as it is the perception about the types
of the results an institution tends to produce that underwrites the prefer-
ence for one institution over the other. The claim relies on an interaction
between an institution’s forms of politics as well as perceived competen-
cies, rather than simply on perceived competencies. It might be that the
institution is producing a worse result because of some difference in com-
petency (e.g. perhaps its lesser political competency leads it to produce
worse results), but it is the results that are motivating the reaction. Put
another way, “[t]he claim is comparative. . . . [Some] institutions . . . will
ordinarily not choose to make the same backlash-producing decisions as
[others].”16 If an institution—the Court or Congress—did make the same
decision, then the same backlash would ensue. It is because of the per-
ceived result of the decision (rather than the institution that delivered it)
that backlash ensues. In other words, whereas the competencies ap-
proach assumes reactions to institutions, the results approach assumes
reactions based on what kinds of things those institutions tend to do and
the reactions they tend to trigger.
Debates over perceived competencies have been a less central part of
the debate than perceived results—in other words, attention has been
devoted more to whether the Court does things that might inspire or
antagonize people than whether the simple fact that it is the Court doing
them that might cause that dynamic. Still, debates over competencies
16. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 392 (2007). For other discussions briefly noting these
differences between competencies and results, see id. at 410–11 (“Americans who entered
politics to oppose Roe were concerned primarily about the substantive law of abortion, not
about questions of judicial technique or even about the proper role of courts in a
democracy.”); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1153, 1216 (2009) (referencing “more general
category of backlash against any public or political decision”); id. at 1218 (“Consider this
counterfactual: suppose that the Hawaii or Massachusetts legislature—and not a court—
had taken the first step on same-sex marriage. It seems highly likely that cultural
conservatives would have seized on the issue with equal gusto.”).
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have featured in the discussion. These debates have typically divided be-
tween those who assume an institutional preference for the Court over
Congress or the reverse, with each describing a set of competing claims
about why a particular institution should decide a contentious constitu-
tional question. Those in support of the Court tend to make a series of
familiar arguments: The Court is independent from politics, it is princi-
pled, and it has a number of other institutionally distinct features increas-
ing its perceived competence in the eyes of the public.
In legal scholarship, since at least the time of the Warren Court, the
largely liberal legal academy struggled with these issues.17 After opposing
the New Deal Court for invalidating progressive legislation—partly by ar-
guing that the public would not stand for a Court resolving issues in a
depression economy—the same constitutional theories were left to han-
dle a Court expanding progressive constitutional norms. The result was
that “the scholarly tradition”18 was supportive of the Court deciding ma-
jor constitutional issues, and not often troubled about whether the public
wanted the Court to be the institution deciding these issues.
At least before popular constitutionalism started to emerge, some-
thing approaching conventional wisdom among scholars held that when
it came to deciding major constitutional issues, people preferred the
Court, or at least did not mind it taking the lead.19 This was part of the
reason why heroic theories of the Court like John Hart Ely’s
“representation-reinforcement,”20 Ronald Dworkin’s “Hercules the
judge,”21 or Bruce Ackerman’s “dualist democracy”22 could exist, thrive,
and dominate legal scholarship. If the people did not want the Court
deciding constitutional issues, then whatever grand theory of the Court
17. See generally Friedman, Birth, supra note 8 (discussing difficulties scholars had R
with liberal Court they supported and series of theories skeptical of aggressive judicial
role).
18. See J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 770–72 (1971) (examining scholarly tradition related to
Warren Court).
19. See Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts, 117 Yale L.J. 886, 911
(2007) (reviewing Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History (2007))
(“[M]embers of the public, more than institutional political actors, have laid the
foundations for judicial supremacy.”); Norman R. Williams, The People’s Constitution, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 257, 257 (2004) (reviewing Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004)) (“[W]e have accepted that, once the federal
courts have spoken, the judiciary’s word on the matter is final—that we the People are
obligated to accede to the judiciary’s interpretation of the Constitution, no matter how
erroneous we think that interpretation may be.”).
20. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980) (arguing judicial review should focus on failures of democratic process).
21. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 238–40 (1986) (advocating model of
“Hercules” judge who respects integrity of law while balancing demands of precedent and
needs of future).
22. See generally 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); 2 Bruce
Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998).
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one had would be complicated because the public would punish the
Court for its excessive activism. Why bother advocating that the Court
should codify constitutional moments if, when the Court did, the political
response would overwhelm the result? Instead, an implicit pro-Court as-
sumption was part of the reason Congress did not interfere with the
Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy: The people did not want Con-
gress to interfere with the Court because the public preferred the
Court.23
Armed with the tools of modern social science, many social psycholo-
gists and political scientists have started to provide related empirical sup-
port for pro-Court perceived competencies. John Hibbing and Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse introduced the notion of “process space” to compete with
the existing concept of “policy space,” indicating that “many people have
vague policy preferences and crystal-clear process preferences, so their
actions can be understood only if we investigate these process prefer-
ences.”24 The Court fell right in the middle of the public’s preferred
“process space,” meaning that the public liked the way the Court did
things. A massive empirical literature supported the notion that the
Court was seen as more legitimate than other institutions,25 and many
even took that to mean there was a pro-Court institutional preference.26
On the other side, there have been many who have argued that there
was a public perception of perceived competencies leaning against the
Court deciding contentious constitutional issues. Alexander Bickel and
his successors remained concerned about this distinctive backlash, to the
point that their concern seemed to suggest that public backlash against
the Court could be viewed as undermining the entire liberal constitu-
tional agenda.27 Michael Klarman, perhaps the foremost contemporary
scholar in this tradition, argued that the Court engendered greater back-
lash because of its ability to quickly and dramatically raise the salience
23. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Congressional Roots of Judicial Activism, 20 J.L. &
Pol. 577, 577 (2004) (“Far from being counter-majoritarian, therefore, judicial activism is
in fact the device Congress relies on to make social policy for the nation, which Congress
either approves of or is at least unwilling to stop.”).
24. John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs
About How Government Should Work 6, 15, 42 (2002).
25. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and
Confirmations: Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People (2009)
[hereinafter Gibson & Caldeira, Citizens].
26. See James L. Gibson, Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and
Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality, 25 Law & Soc’y Rev.
631, 631 (1991) (discussing argument that “those who viewed the Supreme Court as a
more legitimate institution were more likely to accede to an unpopular decision”); Tom R.
Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance
of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 Law & Soc’y Rev. 621,
621 (1991) (“A central tenet about U.S. legal culture is that Americans are more willing to
accept unpopular decisions if those decisions are legitimized by the courts, in particular
the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
27. Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 407. R
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(and hence accentuate cleavages) over controversial issues.28 An even
more common perceived-competencies argument is that the Court en-
genders a distinctive form of backlash with its decisions because it “in-
cite[s] anger over ‘outside interference’ or ‘judicial activism.’”29 William
Eskridge made a similar argument about Roe:
Roe essentially declared a winner in one of the most difficult and
divisive public law debates of American history. Don’t bother go-
ing to state legislatures to reverse that decision. Don’t bother
trying to persuade your neighbors (unless your neighbor is
Justice Powell). . . . Not only did Roe energize the pro-life move-
ment and accelerate the infusion of sectarian religion into
American politics, but it also radicalized many traditionalists.30
The modern conservative movement adopted this rhetorical move, argu-
ing that the people did not support entrusting the Court to decide major
constitutional issues. When Richard Nixon first popularized the phrase
“judicial activism” while running for President in 1968, he presumably
used the phrase often because the notion that it was not for the Court to
be deciding major constitutional issues appealed to people—otherwise a
successful presidential campaign like his would have been less inclined to
make the argument.31 This argument about the undemocratic nature of
judicial review—the fact that it represents “outside interference”32—is
met with a dramatic reaction according to these perspectives: greater an-
ger on the part of those who lost in Court than if they had lost elsewhere,
28. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 Mich. L. Rev.
431, 473 (2005) (stating Court can “raise the salience of an issue” in way harmful to both
cause and to Court). Others have noted this phenomenon but argued that it leads to a pro-
Court institutional sentiment. See Gibson & Caldeira, Citizens, supra note 25, at 3 R
(“[A]nything that causes people to pay attention to courts—even controversies—winds up
reinforcing institutional legitimacy through exposure to the legitimizing symbols
associated with law and courts.”). Robert Post and Reva Siegel have recognized that
Klarman uses this competencies approach, rather than the cultural-political result
approach. Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 392 n.91 (noting Klarman “impl[ies] that R
judicial decisions are inherently more likely to create backlash than legislative decisions”).
They have criticized this position as having “conceptual difficulties.” Id. We do not read
the competencies approach as having conceptual difficulties, but rather as a conceptually
coherent argument capable of being empirically falsified.
29. Klarman, supra note 28, at 473. See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives R
Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2003, at A29 (quoting
former D.C. Circuit Judge Kenneth Starr as stating that courts should not interfere with
“‘the power of the people through their elected representatives to fashion social policy’”).
30. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 Yale L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005). Eskridge
makes similar arguments to Klarman. Id. at 1310 (noting courts “can raise the stakes of
politics by taking issues away from the political system prematurely; by frustrating a group’s
ability to organize, bond, and express the values of its members; or by demonizing an out-
group”).
31. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DePaul L. Rev.
555, 558 (2010) (“Nixon reached out to southern delegates by stressing the limited role
that he thought the federal courts should play in desegregating public schools.”).
32. Klarman, supra note 28, at 473. R
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and greater anger by those who lost than joy by those who won in
Court.33
Behind these competing institutional preferences (either pro- or
anti-Court) are a series of disputes, highlighted briefly already, about the
distinctive decisionmaking qualities of the courts and legislatures: Is the
nondemocratic nature of litigation something that will prevent a Court of
societal elites from understanding and responding sufficiently to the con-
cerns of ordinary citizens,34 or is it precisely because the Court is more
removed from the political process that it is a more trustworthy arbiter of
principle when it comes to fundamental rights?35 Do the detailed factual
and social inquiries that legislatures are capable of making mean they are
better at managing fractious problems,36 or does the openness of the po-
litical process simply make legislatures more available to capture by well-
heeled and influential minorities?37 To those involved in this debate, the
question is one of special knowledge about institutional competence: The
choice of an institution on a particular issue will flow naturally from the
relative capabilities of that institution in comparison to other institutions.
The more one knows and cares about the structure of our democratic
state, the greater the influence one’s knowledge about institutional com-
petence will have on institutional choice.
We differentiate concerns about perceived competencies from an-
other form of institutional preferences in constitutional law: those with
preferences for outcomes or forms of outcomes that a given branch is more or
less likely to produce, and the distinctive politics each institution creates
as a result of the kinds of outcomes it tends to produce.
Klarman has made perceived-competencies arguments of the form
discussed earlier, but also argues that the Court tends to “out-pac[e] pub-
lic opinion on issues of social reform”38 and that there are distinctive
reactions because the Court “command[s] that social reform take place
33. Id. at 475 (noting one “reason that rulings . . . produce political backlashes is that
judicially mandated social reform may mobilize greater resistance” because “critics were
able to deride it as the handiwork of arrogant ‘activist judges’ defying the will of the
people”).
34. Justice Scalia is perhaps the foremost advocate of this position:
The virtue of a democratic system . . . is that it readily enables the people, over
time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted is not so, and to change
their laws accordingly. That system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age
are removed from the democratic process and written into the Constitution.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. See Fiss, supra note 4, at 2 (noting importance of Court’s role in “[s]tructural R
reform” which “involves an encounter between the judiciary and the state bureaucracies”).
36. See 151 Cong. Rec. 21,279 (2005) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (admonishing
judges to “leave politics to the politicians”).
37. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Economic Analysis of Public Law, 1 Eur. J.L. &
Econ. 53, 66 (1994) (describing fears that “Congress has been captured by special-interest
groups and passes laws supporting these groups that harm the general public”).
38. Klarman, supra note 28, at 482. R
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in a different order than might otherwise have occurred.”39 If Congress
arrived at these extreme outcomes, the response would be the same, so
the response is against the outcome and not the institution per se. These
arguments also feature in political debates. David Brooks of The New York
Times has made similar arguments about Roe.40 The decisions generate
negative preferences not only because of the politics they create, but also
because of the different implementation structure for a decision of the
Court as compared to one of Congress.41
The argument about the Court’s influence on opinion has also been
made in support of an institutional preference for the Court; some have
argued that the Court tends to produce certain outcomes that the public
appreciates. Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel have written recently to
say that the politics preceding Roe were responsible for much of what
followed Roe, suggesting that the Court had a powerful political influence
on the debate.42 The important point for now is how this differs from
arguments over perceived competencies: The claim is about a distinctive
form of influence generated by an institution because of the outcomes
that it generates.
Beyond its centrality to the debate in the legal academy, we study
perceived competencies for several practical reasons. First, it is possible to
measure public perceptions of perceived competencies. The same cannot
be said about counterfactual historical questions.43 We cannot measure as
precisely what would have happened if Congress had passed a statute like
the decision the Court issued in Brown. We cannot easily predict whether
39. Id. at 477.
40. David Brooks, Op-Ed., Roe’s Birth, and Death, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2005, at A23
(“When Blackmun wrote the Roe decision, it took the abortion issue out of the legislatures
and put it into the courts. If it had remained in the legislatures, we would have seen a
series of state-by-state compromises reflecting the views of the centrist majority that’s always
existed on this issue.”).
41. See Klarman, supra note 28, at 477–82 (providing examples of how R
implementation structures for court decisions differ from those for congressional
decisions).
42. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2034 (“Attuned to these alternative R
institutional bases for conflict over abortion, we can pick out features of the post-Roe
landscape that raise deep questions about the sufficiency of Court-centered accounts of
backlash . . . .”).
43. What role did Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), play in securing the public’s
perception that women have a right to an abortion? Or in hardening and mobilizing
opposition? Would a world in which the Supreme Court left the regulation of abortion to
the states be one with greater or less support for reproductive rights? Did Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1898), or Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), entrench or transform the public’s conception of the legitimacy of racial equality?
Were the many legislative efforts that preceded and followed it more influential? Has
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and its progeny increased the public’s respect for
gay rights or provoked them into passing a spree of state constitutional amendments
barring courts and legislatures from allowing same-sex marriage? Would a decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), that rejected an individual right to
bear arms have reduced or incited greater public support for gun control?
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going forward Congress or the Court is more likely to produce a Brown or
a Roe, or what those decisions would look like.
Second, the perceived-competencies approach has enormously
broad implications—if the public reacts to an institution every time it de-
cides something, regardless of what it decides, that will affect everything
Congress and the Court do. Our discussion of the perceived-results ap-
proach shall reappear throughout the Article, because Part III in particu-
lar will focus on how the differential politics created by the Court and
Congress can provide differential constraints and empowerments in a
world in which the public has no other ways of differentiating between
the institutions. But throughout the Article our references to institutional
preferences are references to perceived competencies—to reactions to an
institution simply because it is that institution.
B. Measuring Institutional Preferences
With the explosion of research into public opinion and law—particu-
larly in relation to constitutional law—there is no shortage of research
measuring preferences about the law. Despite the important conceptual
and other scholarly work relating to the two main types of institutional
preferences, discussed above, there has been no scholarship directly mea-
suring institutional preferences in the way our study attempts to do. This
is for two separate reasons. First, much of the research does not directly
measure institutional preferences, but instead measures other variables
that may or may not have any relationship to institutional preferences.
Our experimental design is meant to measure a much more transactional
dependent variable, namely which institution (if any) the public wants to
decide constitutional issues. Second, the research in this area does not
question underlying premises about institutional preferences because it
uses independent or dependent variables measuring such preferences in
low-stakes situations.
First, while there is extensive research on public opinion, constitu-
tional law, and the Supreme Court, that research does not directly mea-
sure institutional preferences in constitutional law. Central to this re-
search is the dependent variable of “sociological legitimacy” attributed to
decisions of a legal institution or actor, what Richard Fallon defined as
the concept that these decisions are “accepted (as a matter of fact) as
deserving of respect or obedience—or, in a weaker usage . . . insofar as it
is otherwise acquiesced in.”44 The procedural justice literature measures
the relative legitimacy of decisions by legal authorities, and that literature
has argued that the more procedurally fair the process leading to a deci-
sion by a legal authority, the more legitimacy the public sees in those
44. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787,
1790–91 (2005).
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decisions.45 There are also threads of related literature measuring the
approval for or popularity of the Court.46
Measuring legitimacy or approval, though, is not the same as measur-
ing institutional preferences. Just because an institution is seen as more
or less legitimate or popular in general does not tell us anything about
what it is seen as appropriate for the institution to do in relative terms.47
It might be that greater legitimacy means that there is an institutional
preference for the institution to do more because it is legitimate or popu-
lar. It might be that greater legitimacy means that there is an institutional
preference for the institution to do less because its legitimacy is limited to
a (perceived) narrow and specialized docket. Or it might be that legiti-
macy does not track institutional preference at all because there are no
institutional preferences. One version or another of four different pro-
positions is often used to assess the legitimacy of the Court, for instance,
but these propositions concern whether changes to the Court would be
supported, rather than what the Court should be doing in the first
place.48
It is important, in measuring potentially controversial issues, to util-
ize a research design simulating that controversy. However, in the litera-
ture about legitimacy and the Court, the independent variable that is
manipulated often involves general perceptions of procedural justice or
institutional legitimacy, such as “[y]ou can usually count on the Supreme
Court to make decisions in a fair way,”49 or general measures of “process
preferences.”50 Subjects are never stimulated with something more tangi-
ble and more motivating. Because these studies do not feature immedi-
ate, significant stakes, the findings of this research often do not reflect
the kinds of heated divisions we would expect to find in the real world.51
45. The literature is far too vast to be summarized, but for a helpful overview see
generally Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57
Ann. Rev. Psychol. 375 (2006).
46. For some helpful examples, see Mark D. Ramirez, Procedural Perceptions and
Support for the U.S. Supreme Court, 29 Pol. Psychol. 675, 683-84 (2008) (asking subjects
their sentiments about how Court is “handling their job”).
47. For instance, some studies ask whether the Court has the “legal authority” or “the
final word” in deciding certain issues.  See Jeffrey J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the
Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 675, 680
(1994).
48. The four propositions used to assess the Court’s legitimacy are (1) “If the U.S.
Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might
be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether”; (2) “The right of the Supreme
Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced”; (3) “The Supreme
Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole”;
and (4) “The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.” Gibson & Caldeira,
Citizens, supra note 25, at 46 tbl.3.1. R
49. Tyler & Rasinski, supra note 26, at 625. R
50. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, supra note 24, at 69. R
51. See, e.g., James Gibson, Public Reverence for the United States Supreme Court: Is
the Court Invincible? 9 (July 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“In general, the American people are reasonably satisfied with how
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Our survey design aims to remedy that by asking about preferences
in the face of a salient experimental treatment. The design of our study,
then, is meant to be more psychologically realistic. People do not re-
spond to defining national constitutional issues in the face of flat stimuli.
They decide them based on salient, stimulating, real-world situations.
That is how we want to assess institutional preferences, and it is to that we
now turn.
II. HOW THE PEOPLE PERCEIVE THE CONGRESS AND THE COURT
In this Part we outline our study and our results. We hypothesize an
alternative version of institutional preferences suggesting that these pref-
erences track sensibilities about which institution is most supportive of
one’s worldview, particularly one’s cultural worldview. To measure this
hypothesis, we employed an experimental design directly measuring insti-
tutional preferences as a dependent variable and measuring it in light of
experimental conditions exposing subjects to a story about Congress or
the Supreme Court affirming the constitutional right to gay marriage or
the constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon. The conditions we
used were meant to increase external validity by replicating real-world
institutional actions and doctrinal structures, and were administered in
the weeks before the congressional midterm elections of 2010.
Our findings are simple but striking: Institutional preferences track
priors, particularly cultural priors. To begin with, as in other studies, we
find in our study that cultural priors are much stronger predictors of be-
havior than other attitudinal priors.52 Also consistent with prior research,
we find two cultural orientations explaining dramatic variance in public
views on gay rights and gun rights: one that we describe as “hierarchical-
well the Court does its job . . . .”); see also id. at 4 (“Democrats and Republicans love the
Supreme Court at roughly equal levels, as do liberals and conservatives. Partisan and
ideological differences do indeed characterize policy positions on many issues, but faith in
and loyalty to the Supreme Court seems to be distributed across the ideological and
partisan boards.” (emphasis omitted)).
52. Earlier research has demonstrated that cultural variables are stronger predictors
of behavior than other attitudinal priors:
[A] simple partisan inversion of impressions is necessarily less nuanced than the
cross-cutting shifts observed when members of the sample were classified
simultaneously along the two cultural dimensions. . . . We are eager to add,
however, that we regard the question “what has the biggest impact—culture,
gender, political ideology, race, etc.?”—as ill-posed. Cultural worldviews tend to
cohere with other characteristics—including political affiliation, gender, race,
and class—in patterns that indicate the same latent predispositions the cultural
worldviews by themselves measure. . . . When forced to choose—as one often is,
by sample size—cultural worldviews can be expected to be more discerning
indicators of these predispositions, and hence stronger predictors of cultural
variance in cognition, than these other characteristics.
Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw A Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Kahan et al., They Saw a
Protest] (manuscript at 30 n.93) (citation omitted) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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individualist” (sometimes referred to as “HI”) prizing self-reliance and
favoring traditional forms of social hierarchy, and one that we describe as
“egalitarian-communitarian” (sometimes referred to as “EC”), favoring
less regimented forms of social organization and greater collective atten-
tion to securing individual needs.53 In the four conditions, institutional
preferences track subjects’ sentiments about which institution is affirming
their cultural worldview. Political knowledge is a significant moderating
measure. The more a subject knows or cares about an issue, the greater
an influence their worldview has on their institutional preferences.
Further, and just as striking, we found that rather than changing the
balance of underlying beliefs about gay marriage or carrying a concealed
weapon, action by Congress and the Court tended to make existing be-
liefs more extreme, thereby increasing cultural polarization. While this
effect (relative to the control condition) existed in conditions where ei-
ther institution acted, it was stronger in conditions where the Court
acted.
We also measured electoral preferences in terms of voting prefer-
ence and turnout for the midterm elections for Congress in 2010. We had
a null finding on the former, but found that in several of our conditions
hierarchical-individualists turned out to vote in greater numbers in re-
sponse to Congress or the Court acting, while egalitarian-communitarians
turned out in lower numbers. This effect existed much more in condi-
tions where the Court acted.
A. The Hypothesis: Contingent Institutional Preferences
Arguments over perceived competencies tend, as Part I discussed, to
resolve into competing sets of pro-Congress-anti-Court and pro-Court-
anti-Congress factual claims. Our focus in not on the veracity of these
competing claims about institutional choice, but rather on the structure of
the debate itself: Who believes what, and why? We propose an alternative
account to that of perceived competencies: People conform their factual
beliefs about institutional competence to their intuition about which in-
stitution will provide a preferred outcome.
53. The hierarchical-individualist worldview tends to be associated with the
Republican Party and with those self-identifying as “conservative”; the egalitarian-
communitarian worldview with the Democratic Party and with those self-identifying as
“liberal.” See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729, 784–85 & fig.7 (2010)
[hereinafter Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent] (finding correlation among these
categories). Prior research, however, indicates that value measures of cultural orientation
are far more predictive of factual perceptions and policy preferences than are political
affiliation and ideological self-identification. See John Gastil et al., The ‘Wildavsky
Heuristic’: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion 15 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 107, 2005) [hereinafter Gastil
et al., Wildavsky Heuristic], available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=834264 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]ultural orientation would explain more variance in
policy attitudes than does liberal-conservative self-identification or partisanship . . . .”).
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The battle over institutional choice, on this account, is part of a
broader contest in which the institutions are embroiled. Citizens’ prefer-
ences are contingent on historically grounded conceptions of which insti-
tution will deliver preeminence to the worldview of those citizens. Argu-
ments that courts or legislatures are (or are not) distinctively competent
to decide an issue are not just factual claims; they are also salvos in moti-
vated battles over facts in the world. Preferences regarding institutional
choice are thus contingent on the values a citizen prioritizes and the so-
cial meaning a law or policy holds in relation to those worldviews. And,
again, cultural worldviews are at the middle of this dynamic.
In arguing for this alternative account, we are suggesting that the
institutional debate is like many other debates involving contentious fac-
tual claims, debates deeply shaped by the phenomenon of motivated cog-
nition. Motivated cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to con-
form their processing of new information to their own prior views in a
variety of ways. Perhaps the most dramatic findings with respect to moti-
vated cognition regarding gay marriage and gun control—the two issues
we tested—have come from the subspecies of motivated cognition known
as cultural cognition. Across a diverse array of issues including global
warming,54 gun control,55 date rape,56 HPV vaccination,57 and a host of
other matters,58 empirical research shows that individuals develop distinc-
tive factual beliefs consistent with their core value orientations. We hy-
pothesize that this view of how people process underlying policy issues
and facts can be extended to understanding questions about institutions.
To measure culture, these studies utilize two cultural-value measures
with significant explanatory power: hierarchy-individualism and
egalitarianism-communitarianism.59 Consistent with prior research, we
hypothesize that hierarchy and individualism will strongly predict support
54. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, Cultural
Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. Risk Res. 147 (2011) (finding cultural cognition
informs individuals’ views on climate change research).
55. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:
A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291 (2003) [hereinafter
Kahan & Braman, Gun-Risk Perceptions] (presenting evidence that cultural orientations
affect positions on gun control).
56. See generally Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent, supra note 53 (using R
cultural cognition to examine debate over acquaintance-rape cases).
57. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil &
Paul Slovic, Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study
of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 501 (2010) (using
cultural cognition theory to explain attitudes towards HPV vaccine).
58. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey
Cohen, The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of—and Progress in—
the American Culture War of Fact (GWU Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 370, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(addressing nanotechnology, terrorism, national security, and mass political opinion).
59. See Gastil et al., Wildavsky Heuristic, supra note 53, at 13–16 (proposing and R
describing cultural measures).
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for gun rights and opposition to gay rights, and that egalitarianism and
communitarianism will strongly predict opposition to gun rights and sup-
port for gay rights.60 Normative views about the underlying legal question
will shift, but the valence of the shift will depend on the alignment of the
legal outcome with or against a citizen’s cultural orientation.
A few predictions follow. Institutional preferences will move in the
direction of the institution affirming one’s cultural worldview. Thus, ar-
guments in favor of one institution over another are not formed on
outcome-independent grounds such as design or process. Rather, those
grounds are employed as a justification for institutional choice consistent
with achieving a citizen’s preferred social ordering. When the Court af-
firms a contested cultural position on a major issue, citizens whose
worldviews are so affirmed perceive the Court as more competent; and
when Congress offers affirmation, perceptions of competency shift in a
similar fashion.
Because citizens with relatively egalitarian and communitarian values
are generally supportive of gay rights, and those with relatively hierarchi-
cal and individualistic views are generally opposed, we hypothesize that
legislative and judicial decisions affirming gay rights will drive egalitarian
and communitarian citizens to further support the underlying position
that marriage equality is protected by the Constitution. Conversely, rela-
tively hierarchic and individualistic citizens will become even more ada-
mant in their belief that there is no constitutional protection against mar-
riage discrimination. The reverse, consistent with the largely inverted
belief structures regarding gun rights, will be true about beliefs regarding
whether the Constitution protects the right to carry a concealed weapon.
In both cases, citizens will assess the impact of a new law on their
worldview, and update their own outlook if the law does not threaten
core beliefs that they prize.
Consistent with prior research,61 we also hypothesize that greater po-
litical knowledge and sophistication will generate greater dissensus, rather
60. On the issue of gun control, see Kahan & Braman, Gun-Risk Perceptions, supra
note 55, at 1307 (“[I]ndividuals who were relatively hierarchical in their outlooks were R
nearly twice as likely to oppose gun control as those who were relatively egalitarian, and
individuals who were relatively individualistic were over four times as likely to oppose gun
control as individuals who were relatively solidaristic.”). On the issue of gay rights, see Dan
M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 131–33 (2007) (describing
debate in terms of cultural outlooks); The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law Sch., The
Cultural Cognition of Gay and Lesbian Parenting: Summary of First Round Data
Collection 4–16, available at http://www.culturalcognition.net/storage/Stage%201%20
Report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (presenting
findings).
61. See Gastil et al., Wildavsky Heuristic, supra note 53, at 23 (showing stronger R
relationships between cultural orientations and most policy preferences as political
knowledge increases); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons:
Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change 8 (Cultural Cognition Project,
Working Paper No. 89, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871503 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (finding increased numeracy is associated with increased cultural
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than agreement, because the social meaning of institutional choice is
more salient and cognitively detailed to those with more knowledge
about the body politic. The more politically sophisticated a citizen, the
more partisan cultural affiliations will shape her institutional preference
and the factual justifications she develops for that preference.
We also suspect that what Congress has done to affirm or reject a
particular cultural worldview will contribute to citizens’ desires to express
their views about the institution’s role in the cultural conflict at the ballot
box. The theories of cultural status anxiety that describe much of voting
behavior suggest that a variety of factors will be at play here, with contro-
versial legislative and judicial actions motivating and demotivating differ-
ent portions of the population. But the theories do not suggest—at least
not to us—which effect will predominate with whom. Will citizens be ral-
lied to voting-booth action when they view a new law as disparaging their
way of life, or will they simply be demoralized into abstention?62 Will cul-
tural triumph result in political complacency or inspiration? Having no
compelling reason to take one position or the other, we were curious to
find out which outcome would prevail. Without a hypothesis, then, we
asked a third, exploratory question: How does hearing about a controver-
sial court decision or legislative action affect voting intentions and
turnout?
Although we focus below mostly on two measures known to be ex-
ceptionally strong predictors of attitudes toward gay rights and gun
rights, we do not think they capture all of the motivated cognition that
may be occurring. Beliefs about these issues may be motivated by a host
of other possible identifications and belief sets, such as political party af-
filiation, ideological self-identification, gender, race, rural/urban resi-
dence, and geographical location. Existing research suggests, however,
that these identifications may be less influential than the two on which
this Article focuses. The hypothesis that follows can be generalized to
other less-powerful predictors of attitudes toward and beliefs about gay
rights and gun rights such as political party affiliation and ideological self-
identification, gender, race, rural-urban residence, and region. As part of
our results we will highlight how these priors also motivate reactions to
institutions. For the sake of simplicity, though, we focus on the two cul-
tural measures. Additional results are reported in even greater detail in
the Appendices.
polarization on climate change beliefs, not greater agreement). See generally Jonathan J.
Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56
Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 28, 47 (1993) (“Research reports that
confirmed scientists’ prior beliefs were judged to be of higher quality than those that did
not.”); Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49
Ann. Rev. Psychol. 259, 262 (1998) (describing theoretical approach to bias in research
interpretation).
62. For a significant example of these arguments, see Klarman, supra note 28, at R
473–82 (explaining political backlash to controversial judicial decisions).
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B. The Research Design: Structure and Explanation
1. Design Structure. —
a. Sample. — The subjects for the study consisted of 2,000 American
adults. They were selected randomly from a stratified national sample by
Polimetrix, Inc.63 and participated in the study through Polimetrix’s on-
line testing facilities. Fifty-one percent of the sample was female. Seventy-
six percent were white, and eleven percent African-American. The me-
dian level of education was “some college” but no college degree. The
median annual income was between $40,000 and $49,999. The average
age was 48.
b. Cultural Worldviews and Demographics. — The subjects’ cultural
worldviews were measured (in advance of the study) using two scales used
in previous research on cultural cognition. The scales were composed of
twelve statements such as “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights
in this country” (with increasing agreement indicating lower egalitarian-
ism) and “Society works best when it lets individuals take responsibility
for their own lives without telling them what to do” (with increasing
agreement indicating higher individualism). The participants were
asked to agree or disagree with each statement along a six-point
Likert scale.64 The scales are psychometrically reliable (a = 0.86 for
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism; a = 0.81 for Individualism-Communitarianism)
and loaded appropriately on two orthogonal factors used as continuous
predictors of cultural orientation used in multivariate testing of the study
hypotheses.65
63. Polimetrix (now YouGov) is a public opinion research firm that conducts online
surveys and experiments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and
commercial customers (including political campaigns). See generally Scientific Research:
Survey Research with Social Impact, YouGov, http://corp.yougov.com/scientific-research/
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). YouGov maintains a
panel of over one million Americans that it uses to construct representative study samples.
For more information on the “sample matching” approach, see generally Douglas Rivers,
Sampling for Web Surveys (2007), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/yg-public/
Scientific/Sample+Matching_JSM.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
64. See Gastil et al., Wildavsky Heuristic, supra note 53, at 17 (describing use of survey R
to determine cultural orientation).
65. Cronbach’s alpha (a) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitudinal
scales. By computing the degree of intercorrelation among various items within a scale, it
can be used to assess whether the items can properly be treated as common indicators of a
latent attitude or trait—i.e., one that cannot be directly observed and measured. See
generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination of Theory and
Applications, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 98, 103–04 (1993) (analyzing coefficient’s meaning
and usefulness). Composite scales like those used in this study are desirable because they
not only facilitate measurement of unobservable dispositions, but also enable
measurements that are necessarily more precise than those based on any of the individual
indicators alone, each of which can be seen as an imperfect or “noisy” approximation of
the phenomenon being studied. See generally J. Philippe Rushton, Charles J. Brainerd &
Michael Pressley, Behavioral Development and Construct Validity: The Principle of
Aggregation, 94 Psychol. Bull. 18 (1983) (presenting usefulness of aggregation). Generally,
a = .70 suggests scale validity—i.e., that the aggregated measures furnish a reliable measure
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The subjects’ demographic information (gender, age, income, etc.),
and other measures of worldview, including partisan and ideological self-
identity, and positions on gay rights and gun rights, were also taken
before the study.
c. Stimulus. — The subjects were assigned to read one of four short
articles describing a fictitious and controversial Supreme Court ruling or
congressional act (or to a control condition with no article). We used
these articles to stimulate and challenge underlying sentiment about in-
stitutional preferences in order to examine if the stated preferences per-
sisted. In our experimental design to measure perceived competencies,
we did not just mention the “Court” or “Congress”; we also included
some basic information about how these institutions resolve issues. For
the Court conditions on gun rights, for instance, the subjects read:
The Supreme Court held oral arguments on gun rights, which
were presented by the lawyers for gun rights and by the lawyers
for those opposing gun rights. After these arguments were
presented to the Court, the members of the Court engaged in
private discussions about the case for several months.66
For the Congress conditions, for instance, the subjects read:
Members of Congress met with representatives from affected
communities about this issue, and several committees of
Congress held public hearings on gun rights. Members of
Congress traveling home to their congressional districts to cam-
paign for the next election have also scheduled town hall meet-
ings to discuss these issues with their constituents.67
The entire text of the articles provided to the subjects in each condi-
tion is provided in Appendix A. In the Gun Rights Conditions, the article
reported either: (1) that the Supreme Court had held that the right to
carry a concealed weapon was protected by the Constitution or (2) that
the Congress had passed a law requiring federal and state governments to
allow citizens to carry concealed weapons. In the Gay Marriage
Conditions, the article reported either: (1) that the Supreme Court had
decided that gay marriage was protected by the Constitution or (2) that
the Congress had passed a law requiring federal and state governments to
permit gay marriage.
We now turn to our response measures in the four conditions.
d. Response Measures. — We measured three dependent variables: in-
stitutional preferences, policy preferences, and electoral preferences.
Each of these measures was part of a series of questions asked of the con-
trol group as well as each of the four groups exposed to one of the
conditions.
of the latent trait or attitude. Cortina, supra, at 101 (arguing a = .70 is commonly used, but
occasionally incorrect).
66. See infra Appendix A.
67. See infra Appendix A.
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In the four conditions, after the subjects had read one of the articles,
we asked each to indicate (on a six-point scale) their agreement or disa-
greement with six statements bearing on perceived institutional compe-
tencies.68 The perceived institutional competency items form a reliable
scale, which we call “institutional competence” (a = 0.77), indicating each
subject’s relative inclination to believe the Supreme Court is more com-
petent than Congress to act on this issue. The subjects were also asked to
respond to two statements addressing their preference for one institution
over another in this case: “The Supreme Court, not Congress, should be
deciding issues like these,” and “Congress, and not the Supreme Court,
should be deciding issues like these.” These items were combined into a
scale that we call “institutional preference” (a = 0.66).69
We used shorter response measures to address policy and electoral
preferences. For policy preferences, we used two statements regarding
either gay rights (in the Gay Marriage Conditions) or gun rights (in the
Gun Rights Conditions)70 and two statements regarding consequential
beliefs.71 Our response measures for electoral preferences involved two
questions regarding voting in the upcoming midterm congressional elec-
tion in 2010.72
e. Moderating Measures. — We also asked the subjects two questions
regarding the salience of gun rights73 and nine questions commonly em-
68. Example statements included: “With politically controversial issues like this, the
legislature will better understand the subtleties of how rights apply in a given setting,” and
“When courts decide important issues like these, there is more legitimacy to the decision
because judges are not beholden to political wheeling and dealing in the way that
legislators are.” For a complete list, see infra Appendix B.
69. Although below 0.70, 0.66 represents respectable intercorrelation for a two-item
scale. Cf. supra note 65 (claiming scale validity at a = 0.70). On the relationship between R
the number of items in a scale and Cronbach’s alpha, see Neal Schmitt, Uses and Abuses of
Coefficient Alpha, 8 Psychol. Assessment 350, 351–52 (1996).
70. For example, “The Constitution prohibits the government from treating gay
marriage differently than heterosexual marriage,” and “The government is prohibited
from regulating or banning concealed weapons by the Constitution.” For a complete list,
see infra Appendix B.
71. For example, “Allowing gays and lesbians to marry will undermine traditional
marriage and undermine American families,” and “Prohibiting the use of concealed
weapons makes it hard for ordinary citizens to defend themselves.” For a complete list, see
infra Appendix B.
72. The questions were: “If the elections for Congress were being held today, which
party’s candidate would you be likely to vote for in your congressional district?” and “How
likely are you to vote in the upcoming federal congressional elections in November?”
73. The questions were: “How important is the issue of gun rights or gun control to
you personally?” and “How closely do you follow the debate over gun rights and gun
control?”
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ployed to assess political knowledge.74 These political knowledge items
are widely used to measure variation in expertise and sophistication.75
f. Analytic Measures. — We employed various regression and simula-
tion techniques to test our hypotheses and explore voting preferences.76
Cultural measures and demographics served as independent variables, as
did measures of party affiliation and ideological self-identification as lib-
eral or conservative. Measures of perceived institutional competency and
preference, measures of policy preferences, and measures of electoral
preference served as dependent variables. Where instructive, we em-
ployed measures of political sophistication and knowledge as mediating
variables.77
2. Design Explanations. — The experimental design was meant to rep-
licate actual and potential real-world constitutional conflicts. Subjects in
our control group were provided with measures of institutional prefer-
ences only for Congress and the Supreme Court, and subjects in the four
conditions were provided with narratives involving either Congress or the
Supreme Court. We did not have additional conditions (the President?
74. For example, “How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House
to override a presidential veto? A bare majority (50% plus one), a two-thirds majority, or a
three-fourths majority?” For a complete list, see infra Appendix B.
75. See generally Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, Measuring Political
Knowledge: Putting First Things First, 37 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1179 (1993) (developing and
testing measures of political knowledge). We removed one of the traditional ten measures
(“Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? [The President,
the Congress, or the Supreme Court]”) because, as professors of constitutional law
everywhere like to tell their students, there is arguably more than one correct answer, and
that is what our study is analyzing in the first place.
76. See generally Andrew Gelman & Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models 137–66 (2007) (describing process and usefulness of
statistical simulation); Gary King, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of
Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 347
(2000) (same). Statistical simulations add substantial value to nonlinear multivariate
regression. One of the benefits is clarity. The practical upshot of the conventional
elements of a regression output—including regression coefficients (whether or not
standardized), one or another measure of error (such as standard deviations or t-statistics),
and notations of the presence of specified levels of statistical significance—defy
straightforward interpretation, even by those who know what they signify. Through the use
of simulations, in contrast, a researcher can derive practically meaningful estimates of how
particular explanatory variables (e.g., our cultural worldview measures) influence a
quantity of interest (say, the likelihood that a person will take one position or another on a
contested issue of fact at trial). Such estimates, moreover, often admit of graphic
presentation that conveys relevant information much more readily than do regression
output tables. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the
Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1811,
1817 (2006) (noting graphical displays are more effective than tables); Lee Epstein,
Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective Communication of the Results of
Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 799, 831 (2007) (objecting to use of tables to
display information); Andrew Gelman, Cristian Pasarica & Rahul Dodhia, Let’s Practice
What We Preach: Turning Tables into Graphs, 56 Am. Stat. 121, 121 (2002) (arguing
graphs are superior for making comparisons and predictions).
77. See infra Appendix B for some of the questions we used.
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administrative agencies? lower courts?) simply because of limited finan-
cial resources. As a result, there are some limitations in our capacity to
extrapolate findings to other institutional actors, but also some findings
we can more comfortably begin to extrapolate, as will be detailed. But our
findings have fewer internal validity issues because each condition was
provided a story that was only about the actions of one institution any-
way78—so there was no need to manage the complications of only having
two institutions instead of three or more.
We used descriptions of the Court and Congress, and descriptions of
the constitutional arguments, that were relatively straightforward. We also
structured the conditions to be doctrinally plausible. For the Gay
Marriage Conditions, the constitutional argument that was presented to
the Congress and the Court by pro-gay groups—and ruled in favor of in
those two conditions—is that “the Constitution prohibits governments
from treating gay marriage differently than traditional marriage between
spouses of the opposite sex,”79 an Equal Protection argument made by
plaintiffs in gay marriage cases80 and one that the Court could clearly
hear on appeal and that Congress could at least plausibly remedy pursu-
ant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.81
For the Gun Rights Conditions, the constitutional argument that was
presented to the Congress and the Court pro-gun groups—and ruled in
favor of in those two conditions—is that “federal and state governments
[must] protect the ability of gun owners to carry a concealed weapon.”82
This argument derives from the Second Amendment83 and is an exten-
sion of Heller and McDonald that is already being raised in lower courts.84
An infringement on individuals’ right to bear arms would be a rights vio-
lation that Congress could theoretically remedy. McDonald incorporated
the Second Amendment against the states85 and therefore Congress at
least plausibly has the power to address any violations of that amendment
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
78. Two condition groups were provided narratives only involving Congress, and two
groups were provided narratives only involving the Court. See infra Appendix B.
79. See infra Appendix A (describing hypothetical constitutional arguments brought
by pro-gay groups to Supreme Court).
80. See Klarman, supra note 28, at 450 (noting equal protection arguments made in R
gay marriage cases).
81. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
82. See infra Appendix A.
83. See U.S. Const. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
84. See Brandon P. Denning, Five Takes on McDonald v. City of Chicago, 26 J.L. & Pol.
273, 294–301 (2011) (describing current gun rights litigation since Heller).
85. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“We therefore hold
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second
Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).
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In the control and in all of the conditions, we asked about institu-
tional preferences by asking about a modified version of judicial
supremacy not involving judicial finality. Subjects were asked about which
institution “should decide the issue,” rather than asking whether that in-
stitution should decide the issue finally. We wanted to know which institu-
tion should be seen as predominant because it is rare that, outside of law
schools, constitutional decisions are ever really final in a practical or po-
litical sense.
Our four conditions each involve a decision affirming a constitu-
tional right—two conditions in favor of gay marriage, two conditions in
favor of the right to carry a concealed weapon. Most constitutional issues
the Court or Congress resolve do not involve pro-rights outcomes like
this.86 There is the possibility, then, that anti-rights actions by Congress
and the Court might be different, an issue that further studies should
examine. For the purposes of our experiment, though, it is worth stating
that, historically, pro-rights cases are the types of cases that have featured
most prominently in major cultural conflicts, and the frames thus reflect
our desire to employ paradigmatic cases for complicating institutional
preferences in constitutional law (arguments about backlash typically fea-
ture Brown, Roe, and other such rights-asserting cases rather than rights-
denying cases). But clearly legal actions rejecting rights deserve further
study.
Every study has its limitations, and experimental studies in particular
face external validity limitations.87 By their very nature experimental de-
signs struggle to measure cumulative effects, or at least it is harder for
them to do so.88 This is because experimental designs tend to measure
singular events, and a singular event has its own distinctive features (in
this instance, our conditions feature very prominent cases) creating what
we might call an “N problem.”
We examined singular, high profile constitutional disputes of two va-
rieties (gay marriage and gun rights). This complicates the lessons to be
drawn for multiple disputes (“too few N”), the lessons to be drawn for
different kinds of disputes (“wrong kind of N”), and the lessons to be
drawn for disputes not plausibly of a constitutional nature in the first
place (“no N”). There is evidence that the more times the Court decides
86. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s
Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (2006).
87. See Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?, 104
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 226, 227 (2010) (noting “unrealistically powerful manipulation” may
yield results that do not “generalize beyond the particular study at hand”).
88. See Patrick J. Egan & Jack Citrin, The Limits of Judicial Persuasion and the
Fragility of Judicial Legitimacy 5 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“One limitation of the experimental approach is that the treatment
is a one-time injection of information, whereas in reality a Supreme Court ruling is just the
opening salvo of a debate among the nation’s elites that can quickly overwhelm . . . a
case.”).
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cases, the more of an effect it creates for or against it (“too few N”).89
Also, it might be that for less salient cases (“wrong kind of N”) or cases
clearly not of a constitutional nature at all (“no N”), our conditions could
present issues. Further research about the range of constitutional or
close-to-constitutional-like issues that might come before the Court or
Congress is necessary before making confident predictions on many
fronts.
We focus on the relationship between cultural value measures and
institutional choice rather than party affiliation or ideological self-
identification for several reasons. First, in the data we gathered, as in sev-
eral other prior studies, the value measures were better predictors of atti-
tudes toward gay rights and gun rights, the subject matter on which our
manipulations were based. Once measures for egalitarianism and individ-
ualism were entered into a regression with our measure of attitudes to-
ward gun rights, for example, adding measures of party and ideology, for
example, increased the variance explained by only 2%, increasing the r2
from 0.36 to 0.38. Just as importantly, though, we have a theoretical con-
ception of how values drive opinions about gay rights and gun rights that
is more robust than one that focuses on party affiliation and whether one
labels oneself liberal or conservative. Indeed, to the lament of political
scientists everywhere, the standard measures of party and ideological self-
labeling are notoriously unstable over time and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, notoriously inconsistent predictors of policy attitudes.90 We do not
mean to say that party and ideological labels are irrelevant; in developing
an experiment with a limited sample, however, we opted for the best
predictors we could find.
C. The Results
1. Institutional Preferences. — The results generally support the hy-
pothesis laid out above—priors determine institutional preferences, cul-
tural priors particularly so, and sophistication and salience are major
moderating measures.
Consider, first, Figure 1 below illustrating the relationship between
factual beliefs about the relative competencies of the Supreme Court and
Congress and preferences for one institution relative to the other. Unsur-
prisingly, citizens who agree with statements such as “Courts should de-
cide issues like these because they are less likely to be corrupted by politi-
cal groups that want to distort the facts and the law” and disagree with
89. See Gibson & Caldeira, Citizens, supra note 25, at 5 (“[T]he views of African R
Americans towards the United States Supreme Court evolved over time from strong
support to considerable suspicion.”).
90. There is an extensive literature on this topic following the seminal work of Philip
Converse. See generally Philip Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in
Ideology and Discontent 206 (David E. Apter ed., 1964). For further discussion on the
relationship between value measures and ideology, see generally Gastil et al., Wildavsky
Heuristic, supra note 53. R
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statements such as “The legislature should decide issues like these be-
cause they are less likely to be influenced by high-powered lawyers who
don’t have the public’s best interest at heart” are more likely to prefer
that the Supreme Court decide a matter than Congress. Subject’s beliefs
about the relative competence of institutions and their preference for
those institutions are tightly bound up with each other.
PREFERENCE FOR CONGRESS OR THE COURT CLOSELY CORRELATED WITH














Figure 1. Derived from univariate regression; detailed results are re-
ported in Table 1, Model 1 in Appendix C. The values on the left are
standard deviations in variance for the dependent variable institutional-
preference. The values were obtained through regression based simula-
tions with institutional-competence scale set to one standard deviation
below the mean on the left (indicating belief in the competence of
Congress relative to the Supreme Court) and one standard deviation
above the mean on the right (indicating belief in the competence of the
Supreme Court relative to Congress).
At first glance, this finding might seem like a reason for those argu-
ing that citizens have real institutional preferences to rejoice: Institu-
tional preference appears to correlate (and correlate very strongly) with
their ostensibly outcome-independent justifications.
But this relationship is illusory; further inspection reveals that beliefs
about the competence of the institutions themselves are contingent, in
significant part, on whether the institution delivers an outcome that a
subject favors. As illustrated in Figure 2, subjects with relatively egalitarian
and communitarian values were significantly more likely to agree with
pro-Court items in our institutional competence scale in the condition in
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which they read that the Supreme Court had just made law favoring gay
rights.
Difference between HI Pro Gay Congress & HI Pro Gay SCOTUS:
−0.09 SD (±0.17)
Difference between EC Pro Gay Congress & EC Pro Gay SCOTUS:
0.42 SD (±0.19)
EC BELIEFS ABOUT COMPETENCE OF COURT

































Figure 2. Derived from multivariate regression; detailed results are
reported in Table 2, Model 1 in Appendix C. “Hierarchical-Individualist”
and “Egalitarian-Communitarian” reflect values set, respectively, at +1 SD
and −1 SD on both the hierarchy and individualism predictor scales. Re-
sponses on institutional competence scale were converted to z-scores to
promote ease of interpretation.
But subjects with relatively hierarchic and individualist values, in con-
trast, viewed the Supreme Court as relatively unsuited to decide an issue
like gay marriage—something they strongly believed should be left to
Congress to determine. And this was so whether it was Congress or the
Court delivering a favorable decision. Does that not indicate that they,
perhaps, are principled in their evaluations of institutional competency,
even if egalitarian communitarians are not?
In a word, no. Those with relatively hierarchic and individualist val-
ues, although skeptical of the Court’s competence to decide an issue like
same-sex marriage equality, were not staunchly anti-Court. As can be seen
below in Figure 3, their beliefs about the Court’s relative qualifications
were labile across the pro-gun-rights conditions.
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Difference between EC Pro Gun Congress & EC Pro Gun SCOTUS:
0.06 SD (±0.17)
Difference between HI Pro Gun Congress & EC Pro Gun SCOTUS:
0.49 SD (±0.16)
EI BELIEFS ABOUT COMPETENCE OF COURT






















EC beliefs in competence of
Court remains unchanged







Figure 3. Derived from multivariate regression; detailed results are
reported in Table 3, Model 1 in Appendix C. “Hierarchical-Individualist”
and “Egalitarian-Communitarian” reflect values set, respectively, at +1 SD
and −1 SD on both the hierarchy and individualism predictor scales. Re-
sponses on institutional competence scale were converted to z-scores to
promote ease of interpretation.
Although those with relatively egalitarian and communitarian values
voiced only an average belief in the Court’s competence to decide gun
rights issues across conditions (as indicated by a score close to zero),
those with relatively hierarchic and individualist values went from skepti-
cism in the condition in which they read about Congress delivering them
gun rights to strong belief in the Supreme Court’s competence in the
condition in which the Court delivered those rights.
Our point is not that these changing beliefs are irrational—far from
it. If an institution delivers a result that is congenial to a citizen’s cultural
outlook, that citizen has plenty of reasons to believe that the institution in
question is likely to protect their interest in other ways as well. Rather,
our point is that, in light of this evidence that beliefs about relative insti-
tutional competence shift in this way, it will be very hard to disentangle
debates over the structural differences between the institutions from the
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 31  3-MAY-12 9:13
2012] JUDICIAL BACKLASH OR JUST BACKLASH? 761
outcomes they are delivering. In short, the competency debate is
outcome-related in a way that institutional purists disavow.
Those involved in the debate over institutional choice might seek
refuge in the logic of expertise. Relatively few citizens follow politics
closely or know much about the structure of our political system. Perhaps
lack of sophistication is what drives these kinds of effects: Those without
knowledge of how our democracy is structured, one might surmise, will
be more results-oriented precisely because they lack the kind of expertise
that will allow them to make more principled results-independent distinc-
tions between institutions.
Our data provide this theory scant shelter. When we enter political
knowledge as a moderating variable, we see just the reverse: The more
knowledgeable the subjects in our sample, the more labile their reactions
across conditions. Consider Figures 4 and 5, illustrating the increased
effect among relatively egalitarian-communitarian subjects across
the Gay Rights Conditions and a similar effect among relatively
hierarchical-individualist subjects across the Gun Rights Conditions.
CHANGE IN EC BELIEFS ABOUT COMPETENCE IN GAY RIGHTS






















Figure 4. Derived from multivariate regression; detailed results are
reported in Table 1, Model 2 in Appendix C. Values estimated for
“Egalitarian-Communitarians,” with values set at +1 SD on both the hier-
archy and individualism predictor scales. Values estimated for “Low So-
phistication” and “High Sophistication” reflect values set, respectively, at
+1 SD and −1 SD on the sophistication moderator scale. Responses on
institutional competence scales shown on the y-axis were converted to z-
scores to promote ease of interpretation.
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CHANGE IN HI BELIEFS ABOUT COMPETENCE IN GUN RIGHTS






















Figure 5. Derived from multivariate regression; detailed results are
reported in Table 3, Model 2 in Appendix C. Values estimated for
“Hierarchical-Individualists,” with values set at +1 SD on both the hierar-
chy and individualism predictor scales. Values estimated for “Low Sophis-
tication” and “High Sophistication” reflect values set, respectively, at +1
SD and −1 SD on the sophistication moderator scale. Responses on insti-
tutional competence scales shown on the y-axis were converted to z-scores
to promote ease of interpretation.
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2. Shifting Norms. — The effects of Court- and Congress-made law on
beliefs about underlying issues are illustrated in figures 6 and 7 below.
CONGRESSIONAL & COURT CONGRESSIONAL & COURT ACTIONS
ACTIONS INCREASE POLARIZATION INCREASE POLARIZATION ON































Figures 6 & 7. Derived from multivariate regression; detailed
results are reported in Table 4, Models 1 & 2 in Appendix C.
Values estimated for “Hierarchical-Individualist,” “Mean,” and
“Egalitarian-Communitarian” reflect values set, respectively, at +1 SD, the
mean, and −1 SD on both the hierarchy and individualism predictor
scales. Scales measuring support for gay marriage and concealed carry
shown on the y-axes were converted to z-scores to promote ease of
interpretation.
With respect to the sample as a whole, there is almost no change in
the average position on gay rights or gun rights across conditions. The
change in average support for gay marriage and concealed carry, indi-
cated by the medium-grey lines, is indistinguishable from zero in every
condition, indicating no statistically significant change in support for a
right to gay marriage or a right to carry a concealed weapon.91
But the lack of a change in the average conceals a great deal of varia-
tion among those most invested in debates over these issues: those with
relatively hierarchic and individualistic values and those with relatively
egalitarian and communitarian values. These citizens were moved to
greater polarization in both the congressional and Supreme Court condi-
tions. Note, however, that although the increased distance between the
two is significant in both Congress and Supreme Court conditions, views
about the constitutionality of the right in question are significantly more
polarized in conditions in which the Court acted than conditions in
which Congress acted. Controversial actions by the Supreme Court, at
91. This, of course, does not mean there was no effect, just that it was undetectable in
our sample. The null hypothesis cannot be proven.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-MAY-12 9:13
764 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:731
least in the experimental conditions we have explored, are significantly
more polarizing than similar actions by Congress when it comes to the
underlying policy issue.
3. Ballot-Box. — Our exploratory analysis of the effects of voting in-
tentions can be broken down into two distinct questions. First: Did the
manipulations have an effect on which party subjects said they were most likely to
vote for in the upcoming election? Our data provide no definitive answer to
this question. Our data were unable to detect a statistically significant
shift in party-voting intentions among hierarchical-individualists, or
egalitarian-communitarians. However, the justifiably infamous Type II
error—mistaking the failure to prove an effect as proof of the null hy-
pothesis—is a cautionary concern here. We cannot state that there is no
relationship, just that we have not found one. Perhaps with greater sam-
ple size or a different sample, a significant effect would appear.
The second question was not about partisan preference, but motiva-
tion: Does action by the Court or Congress make individuals more or less likely to
vote in an upcoming election? Our findings are illustrated in figures 8 and 9
below:
SUPREME COURT ACTION ON GAY CONGRESSIONAL & SUPREME COURT
MARRIAGE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES ACTION ON CONCEALED CARRY













































































Figures 8 & 9. Derived from ordered logistic regression; detailed re-
sults are reported in Table 5, Models 1 & 2 in Appendix C. Values esti-
mated for “Hierarchical-Individualist,” “Mean,” and “Egalitarian-
Communitarian” reflect values set, respectively, at +1 SD, the mean, and −
1 SD on both the hierarchy and individualism predictor scales. Scale mea-
suring likelihood of voting indicates a response of “very likely.” The gap
between hierarchical-individualist voters and egalitarian-communitarian
voters increases substantially in the Supreme Court condition affirming a
right to gay marriage. (It also increases a little in the Congress condition
establishing a right to marriage equality, but the difference is not statisti-
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cally significant). And the gap expands in both the Congress and Court
conditions affirming a right to carry a concealed weapon. It seems that
the Court and Congress polarize policy preferences and turnout, and in
both situations the Court polarizes to a greater degree. It is also notable
that in each of the three conditions with statistically significant move-
ment, hierarchical-individualists become more likely to vote and egalita-
rian-communitarians become less likely to vote. It seems that any action
on constitutional issues in these conditions, regardless of the direction or
the institution, mobilizes hierarchical-individualists and depresses turn-
out among egalitarian-communitarians.
Having no strong priors, any theory we develop to explain these re-
sults would necessarily be post hoc and somewhat of a “just so story.” But
one thing we can say for certain is that our data do not fit the traditional
ballot-box “backlash” theory. To be sure, the Gay Marriage Conditions
seems to fit the pattern of a “backlash,” with voter mobilization among
opponents of gay marriage and lower motivation among supporters. But
in the Gun Rights Conditions, we see just the reverse of what the backlash
theory would predict: Egalitarian-communitarians, rather than being gal-
vanized by an assertion of gun rights, instead appear dispirited and (rela-
tively) inactive compared to their victorious hierarchical individualist ad-
versaries. Like any study worth its salt, ours raises as many questions as it
answers, and more experimental research is needed to understand the
logic of voters in reaction to controversial decisions by Congress and the
Court.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE COUNTRY
Our study is just the first step in examining the multiple institutional
issues at stake in constitutional law, and the results of those studies will
have implications for the analysis of this study. What if we added the
President to the mix? What about federalism? In addition to what the
Court or Congress decides, there are several other “decision attributes”
(vote margin, style of reasoning, and so on) that might affect institutional
preference.92 There are many questions to be answered on this thread of
institutional preferences in constitutional law.
What follows, then, is a preliminary discussion of the implications of
contingent institutional preferences, with the recognition that this discus-
sion is indeed provisional. Of course, the degree to which these findings
might matter depends on how much one takes a consequentialist vision
of judicial review.93 Even for the nonconsequentialist, though, it is rele-
92. For the most helpful summary of various of these features, see generally James
Spriggs, John T. Scott & James R. Zink, Courting the Public: The Influence of Decision
Attributes on Individuals’ Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. Pol. 909 (2009).
93. For a discussion of these themes, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would
Be Outraged by Their Decisions, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 155 (2007)
(arguing judges should be cognizant of public opinion, if not necessarily controlled by it).
For a response to Sunstein, see generally Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response
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vant that “[l]acking electoral legitimacy or a police force, judges are
highly dependent on public acceptance of their authority. If the public is
outraged, judicial authority might well be jeopardized.”94
We examine the implications of our results for the two key categories
of actors in constitutional law: those who operate with the coercive power
of the law behind them (the Supreme Court and Congress), and those
who operate outside of government and try to influence what those in-
side of government do. We examine the Court from two perspectives: one
looking at public-regarding implications and one looking at the implica-
tions for a Court with a (partial) agenda. From the public-regarding per-
spective, our results suggest that the Court is much less constrained by
preferences and much more constrained by politics than had been previ-
ously thought. We also discuss how we might construct a system in
which—given contingent institutional preferences—a Court making diffi-
cult decisions can still appeal to most Americans. We discuss how the
combination of the reverence for the Court and the reductive nature of
the debate about the Court increases our cultural polarization, and how
difficult it can be for those with differing worldviews to reach across the
cultural aisle when evaluating the institutions involved in constitutional
politics. Rather than expecting constitutional conflict to feature cross-
cultural efforts, we propose participants in these conflicts recognize the
limitations of their own perspective, which can produce similar effects.
For the partial Court, our results suggest that a partisan Court trying
to pursue an aggressive constitutional agenda has more flexibility to act
because of how culturally contingent institutional preferences operate. A
Court deciding in favor of gay marriage or in favor of gun rights can
expect a base of supporters even more supportive of the Court’s institu-
tional role and of the underlying constitutional issue because of the
Court’s decision. This base of support may insulate the Court from imme-
diate backlash. On the flip side, though, an egalitarian-communitarian
Court has reason to worry about electoral turnout, because our results
suggest that any Court decision demobilizes voters supportive of these
Court decisions in that circumstance and increases turnout among con-
servative voters.
For Congress, our results suggest that the public might not mind
congressional constitutional interpretations as much as might be as-
sumed. Instead, there is much room for Congress to interpret the
Constitution. Judicial supremacy is not the entrenched feature of public
opinion that so many have assumed, and so a Congress attuned to the
realities of constitutional politics has plenty of room to act on constitu-
tional issues. Again, though, we suggest caution, but at least for gay mar-
to If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan. L. Rev.
213 (2007) (elaborating on Sunstein’s basic framework of judicial cognizance).
94. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 171. R
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riage Congress risks mobilizing turnout at the ballot box against its
decision.
For social movements trying to extract constitutional results from in-
stitutions, the lessons are that where one goes to look for these results
matters less than what one can expect from where one goes to look for
these results. The competencies approach that has garnered so much at-
tention among social activists does not provide much strategic guidance
for movements. Instead, attention might be directed to the cultural-
political differences between the institutions and the politics they gener-
ate. Likewise, constitutional theorists should stop discussing constraints
on the role of the Court so much, because the public does not think the
way some theorists seem to assume or presume.
A. The Institutional Actors of Constitutional Law
1. The Supreme Court. — We discuss below what our findings might
mean for the Supreme Court. We do not endorse a particular view of the
Court as acting either faithfully for us all or strategically for some of us,
but simply highlight what our findings suggest for both potential views of
the Court.
a. The Public-Regarding Court. —
i. Separation of Powers and Institutional Preferences. — Our federal sys-
tem relies on separation of powers among the branches of government to
function properly. The basic design, as Madison saw it, is one in which
“ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”95 This means not only
that ambitious outcomes constrain ambitious outcomes, but also that am-
bitious self-defined institutional roles constrain ambitious self-defined in-
stitutional roles. No branch is supposed to do everything while another
branch does nothing. And so part of what our separation of powers de-
sign is intended to do is to create limits on decisions but also to create
limits on agendas.
Article III of the Constitution indicates a number of cases compris-
ing the mandatory docket of the Court,96 and then specifies a discretion-
ary docket, which Congress has modified over the years.97 Constitutional
theorists, meanwhile, have spilled much ink trying to define the role of
the Court. Dan Kahan has referenced these efforts as responses to the
95. The Federalist No. 51, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.”).
97. See id. (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.”). For a helpful summary of these changes and the
controversies surrounding them, see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1657–60
(2000).
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“neutrality crisis”98 created by Herbert Weschler and the desire to find
“neutral principles” in constitutional law.99 From Ackerman to Dworkin
to Ely, constitutional law remains fixated on telling us not just what the
Court should decide, but when the Court should decide. While the neu-
trality crisis has undermined outcome-independent theories about what
the Court should decide, in many ways it has relied on process as the last
refuge. Even as disagreement persists about how to decide certain cases,
agreement seems to persist about when and whether to decide certain
cases.
Chief among these outcome-independent constraints on the Court is
the theory of “backlash” and the self-enforcing nature of that theory. Sup-
porters of a cause, according to this theory, are less likely to support the
cause because of a dislike for the court-centeredness of the change, and
perhaps because the sweet smell of victory makes them less motivated to
keep fighting the good fight.100 Opponents of the outcome, angered by
the decision taking the issue out of the democratic process—and more
aware of their disagreement because the decision generates focus on the
issue101—mobilize and vote in greater numbers. Because of greater oppo-
sition by initial supporters and by initial opponents, there is a net in-
crease in disfavor for the overaggressive decision by the Court. Backlash
against the Court is a form of the “political safeguards”102 that reinforce
the separation of powers: If the Court oversteps, supporters will desert it
and opponents will mobilize against it. So, the argument goes, overstep-
ping by the Court in Brown changed elections in the South,103 and over-
stepping by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge af-
fected the 2004 presidential election.104
Our results suggest this self-enforcing feature of backlash does not
transpire this way. When the Court decides an issue, the supporters of the
decision believe even more (not less) that the Court was right to decide
it. Backlash theorists are right to suspect that opponents of the decision
98. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 51 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan, Neutral Principles] (“Relieving citizens of the
anxiety that the Court is resolving cases in a partisan manner is the asserted justification for
‘constitutional theories.’”).
99. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959) (arguing for transcendent reasoning and analysis in Supreme
Court opinions).
100. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 941, 951 (2011)
(“[F]ocusing on courts (and litigation) . . . demobilizes a potentially vibrant movement.”).
101. See Klarman, supra note 28, at 473 (stating that court rulings produce backlash R
by “rais[ing] the salience of an issue” to opponents).
102. See Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543, 558 (1954) (“[T]he national political process in the United States . . . is intrinsically
well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions . . . on the domain of the states.”).
103. See Klarman, supra note 28, at 453–58 (describing backlash after Brown). R
104. See id. at 459–73 (describing backlash after Goodridge).
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become even less supportive of the Court deciding issues, but those
switches are effectively (more or less depending on the condition) can-
celled out by opponents of the decision switching in the other direction
against the Court.
There is still some evidence that backlash could be self-enforcing,
depending on the condition. When hierarchical-individualists win in the
Court on gun rights, or lose in the Court on gay marriage, they are more
likely to vote, and egalitarian-communitarians are less likely to vote. This
could be described as backlash if the Court decides a gay marriage case
because of electoral results (more opponents voting and fewer supporters
voting), but entrenchment if the Court rules in favor of gun rights (more
supporters voting and fewer opponents voting).
Backlash could still be self-enforcing because of the activities of “po-
larization entrepreneurs.”105 In other words, whatever alignment of indi-
viduals is outraged by the Court deciding an issue might create a move-
ment against the Court even if the median preference is not reflected in
that movement. It could be that the right people in the right positions
are outraged, and this triggers a backlash even if this is not reflected in
the general public opinion that we measured.
If the range of self-enforcing constraints envisioned by backlash do
not all exist, or at least exist in equal numbers, how else is the Court
constrained? Another way in which the separation of powers might con-
strain the Court is the craft or professional sanction that might keep the
Court in place. The Court pays great attention to how elites perceive it,
particularly legal elites.106 If the Court oversteps proper limitations, then
perhaps the condemnations of the professional community (think of
Judge Learned Hand’s attack on Brown)107 or other elites and interest
groups will ensue.
But our results suggest that subjects with higher salience and/or so-
phistication scores are even less likely to evaluate institutional prefer-
ences independent of outcome preferences. A reader of Barry
Friedman’s scholarship on debates within constitutional scholarship—
and the oscillations of liberal theorists between support for and opposi-
tion to the Court depending on what the Court was doing—should not
105. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
Yale L.J. 71, 97 (2000) (“‘[P]olarization entrepreneurs’ . . . creat[e] . . . spheres in which
like-minded people can hear a particular point of view from one or more articulate people,
and also participate . . . in a deliberative discussion in which that point of view becomes
entrenched and strengthened.” (footnote omitted)).
106. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites,
Not the American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010) (arguing “Supreme Court
Justices care more about the views of academics, journalists, and other elites than they do
about public opinion”).
107. See Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 54 (1958) (asserting that in “The
Segregation Cases” the Court “mean[t] to reverse the ‘legislative judgment’ by its own
appraisal”).
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be surprised.108 The numbers in our study are not small, either: If the
Court rules in favor of gun rights, for instance, those on the higher end
of the sophistication scale in favor of gun rights prefer the Court by much
more, and those at the higher end of the sophistication scale against gun
rights by much less. The Court breaks even when it decides an issue, and
so there is no self-enforcing backlash by elites either.
What, then, constrains the Supreme Court, if some of the assump-
tions of the backlash theory and competencies approach do not? The
large majority of the cases that the Court decides are much lower salience
than gay marriage or gun rights cases.109 If low-salience cases feature
more outcome-independent institutional preferences, then in the large
majority of the cases the Court hears it might be constrained by a self-
enforcing backlash.
Self-enforcing constraints also exist when the Court decides a case in
a way that no worldview shared by any meaningful percentage of the pop-
ulation supports—a case like Citizens United might be an example of this
(with 80% of the public disapproving elements of the decision).110 These
decisions do produce a net backlash that can harm the Court. Lowering
decision costs and ensuring that the Court does not issue a Citizens United
may be part of the reason why the Court has largely decided cases in a
way that national majorities support111—if a Justice does not know who
will support a decision, and it is difficult to ascertain, better to shoot for
the median.
In the high-salience cases like those discussed in our study, even if
outcome-independent preferences do not constrain the Court, part of
what constrains the Court is what constrains other actors as well: the polit-
ical back and forth of separation of powers. Part of this effect stems from
the political back and forth not derived from specialized impressions of
institutional roles, but from the result of normal ambition counteracting
ambition. But part of what constrains the Court derives from the dynam-
ics triggered by the Court, what we highlighted as the other version of
backlash and institutional preferences in Part I. Because the Court has
108. See Friedman, Birth, supra note 8, at 155 (suggesting “numerous . . . . Supreme R
Court decisions striking down progressive constitutional legislation . . . [have] led to a
spate of articles decrying the inconsistency of democracy with judicial review, and calling
for constitutional interpretation outside the courts”).
109. See Schauer, supra note 86, at 9 (“For in reality neither constitutional R
decisionmaking nor Supreme Court adjudication occupies a substantial portion of the
nation’s policy agenda or the public’s interest . . . .”).
110. See Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive: Did the Roberts
Court Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform?, Slate.com (Jan. 25, 2010,
2:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/
speeding_locomotive.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing public
response to Citizens United).
111. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L.
Rev. 489, 501 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court tends, in the long run, to cooperate with the
vector sum of forces in national politics.”).
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“neither the purse nor the sword,”112 it might be institutionally disadvan-
taged in playing this normal separation of powers game. Even if people
do not perceive the Court differently, that does not mean the Court is
immune from normal political constraints or even more significant politi-
cal constraints (because of its relative lack of hard power).
b. A Court for Everyone. — There is a widely articulated and held cul-
tural script that the Court is the institution to serve all of us from all cul-
tural perspectives. Terry Maroney has termed this the “persistent cultural
script of judicial dispassion.”113 Even those who want empathetic Justices
want them to use empathy to be able to appreciate the perspectives of
others who differ from them.114 The social scientists tell us that support
of all sorts for the Court is much higher than any other institution, now
or during modern times, across ideologies.115 In the aftermath of Bush v.
Gore,116 Linda Greenhouse summarized a belief that the Court was dis-
tinctively able to “take a bullet for the country.”117
But our results suggest this is not the way people think. They are
culturally motivated in how they perceive the role of the Court in the
same way they are culturally motivated in how they perceive a congres-
sional law about abortion or an executive order about stem cells or mili-
tary commissions. If we perceive the role of the Court in the same cultur-
ally biased way we perceive everything else, is there any way to rise above
that?
We discuss in this section the lesser need for unifying strategies be-
cause of the nature of most and even controversial constitutional deci-
sions by the Court. But in those situations in which we do not want those
from diverging perspectives to see the world in different ways, we discuss
how the nature of the rhetoric about the Court makes the situation
worse. Rather than helping us to recognize that our perspectives are bi-
ased, the public discussion about the Court pushes bias underground,
thereby making it worse.
i. Affirmation to Make the Court for Everyone: Affirming Constitutional
Others. — As an initial matter, in most cases finding unifying strategies is
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 Calif.
L. Rev. 629, 633 (2011) (“[J]udicial dispassion has come to be regarded as a core
requirement of the rule of law, a key to moving beyond the perceived irrationality and
partiality of our collective past.”).
114. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy 1–2 (2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing judges should
use empathy, or “cognitive ability to understand a situation from the perspective of other
people, combined with the emotional capacity to comprehend and feel those people’s
emotions in that situation”).
115. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (discussing empirical literature on R
perceptions of Court’s legitimacy).
116. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
117. See Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, 4 Green Bag 381, 382
(2001) (“[T]he Court’s intervention was an act of judicial statesmanship that saved the
country from judicial and political chaos.”).
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unnecessary. Low-salience cases feature cultural priors affecting prefer-
ences much less than in other cases, and so there is no need to rise above
cultural bias.118 In the large majority of other cases, “affirmation”119
might be able to overcome cultural bias. By affirmation, we mean rein-
forcing and recognizing the validity of an opposing worldview—in this
case, an opposing constitutional worldview.120 As Dan Kahan puts it,
“[w]hen information is presented under conditions that effectively affirms
[sic] an individual’s identity, that individual is far less likely simply to dis-
miss evidence and arguments that challenge a belief.”121 One of us has
noted that these approaches can have some benefits in constitutional
law.122
This psychological principle of “affirmation” has perhaps motivated
the search for unifying theories of constitutional law, with the hope that a
properly calibrated frame can unify otherwise fragmented constituencies.
The belief has been that “[i]t takes a theory to beat a theory”123 and so
finding the right theory could do the trick. Jack Balkin has argued that
liberal originalism might perform this role.124 Noah Feldman has argued
that focusing on the flaws with democratic capitalism can perform this
118. See Robert S. Baron et. al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J.
Experimental Soc. Psychol. 537, 538 (1996) (“[I]ndividuals may avoid taking extreme
positions unless they have a good deal of certainty regarding the issue.”).
119. See, e.g., Kevin R. Binning, David K. Sherman, Geoffrey L. Cohen & Kirsten
Heitland, Seeing the Other Side: Reducing Political Partisanship via Self-Affirmation in the
2008 Presidential Election, 10 Analyses Soc. Issues & Pub. Pol’y 276, 276 (2010) (finding
that “providing individuals a chance to affirm their self-integrity” relieved “pressure to
adhere to their [political party’s] core beliefs and behaviors”); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua
Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation
by Affirming the Self, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1151, 1151 (2000) (finding
evidence consistent with theory that “defensive reactions [in the face of disconfirming
evidence] would be ameliorated by an affirmation of an alternative source of self-worth”).
120. See David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening
Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 Current
Directions Psychol. Sci. 119, 119 (2002) (“[P]eople respond to information in a less
defensive and more open-minded manner when their self-worth is buttressed by an
affirmation of an alternative source of identity.”).
121. Kahan et al., They Saw a Protest, supra note 52 (manuscript at 41). R
122. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public
Policy, 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 149, 168 (2006) (“Policymakers can harness this identity-
affirmation effect by designing policies that are sufficiently rich in their social meanings to
affirm the values of persons of diverse cultural worldviews simultaneously.”).
123. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 617
(1999).
124. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2012) (arguing that liberal
originalism appeals to broad and previously unreachable constituencies).
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role.125 Kenji Yoshino has argued that deciding cases on liberty rather
than equality grounds can attract wider support for decisions.126
Affirmation and the constitutional theories emanating from related
impulses might work in the large majority of cases that the Court hears,
but it still leaves us with complications for the most salient, blockbuster
cases the Court hears—like the two cases we asked about in our study. In
those cases, it is hard to imagine affirmation working as well. Affirmation
in these instances (because cultural priors are so intense) is expensive
because it requires individualized intervention, dialogue, deliberation,
and debiasing—something it would be costly and difficult to do each
time the Court issues a high-profile constitutional decision for the hun-
dreds of millions of Americans affected by these decisions.127
Let us start with the Justices. It is hard to imagine Justice Scalia pref-
acing his opinion in Lawrence v. Texas by first recognizing how important
equality is to the gay community, before continuing on to insist that the
Court “has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda . . .
[and] dismantle[d] the structure of constitutional law.”128 It is hard to
imagine Justice Ginsburg starting her dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart with a
paean to the religious significance of the unborn fetus before describing
how the Court’s pro-life decision interferes with “a woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course.”129 Individuals are nominated to the Court
because they are committed to the cultural perspective behind the
agenda of the senator belonging to the nominating President’s party on
salient issues.130 The President must nominate individuals like this to sat-
isfy core members of his own political party.131
Our results suggest that it is difficult in high-salience cases for the
public to receive these messages as anything other than coded cultural
acceptance or rejection. Affirmation and its debiasing can be drowned
out by the polarizing rebiasing being performed by interested parties in
these cases. In high-salience cases, by the time the case reaches the Court,
lawyers (and others) have worked diligently (and effectively) to frame
these cases in ways meant to appeal to partial cultural communities, so
125. See Noah Feldman, Imagining a Liberal Court, N.Y. Times Magazine, June 27,
2010, at 39, 41–42 (arguing that limitations on capitalism are more acceptable).
126. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 792–97
(2011) (arguing that liberty and dignity-based decisions are more acceptable than equality-
based decisions).
127. See Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider-an-
Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1069, 1070
(1995) (describing methodology behind debiasing).
128. 539 U.S. 558, 602–05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments 110–11 (2005) (noting ideological congruity between senators belonging to
nominating President’s party and their Court nominees).
131. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 381, 450 (“[T]he politicization of the confirmation process has been made even
more dramatic by the increasingly aggressive involvement of interest groups.”).
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that by the time the case makes its way to the Court it is fraught with
heavy, culturally-loaded messages. And so even the best efforts at affirma-
tion might fall on culturally-biased ears.
Consider, for example, Lawrence. One could argue that the Court
tried its best to appeal to both natural supporters of the decision
(egalitarian-communitarians) as well as to potentially natural opponents
of the decision (hierarchical-individualists). The decision in Lawrence ex-
panded constitutional protections for gay Americans as well as straight
Americans because it was a substantive due process decision.132 The ma-
jority opinion explicitly bracketed the issue of same-sex marriage as one
that the Court was not deciding.133 Kenji Yoshino praised these features
of the opinion as “quiet[ing] pluralism anxiety.”134
But, despite its best efforts, affirmation might have been impossible
in Lawrence because the affirming and anxiety-quieting were drowned out
by what preceded the case as well as what followed it. Gay rights were
already an issue being intensely debated by various cultural communities,
with liberal interest groups highlighting Lawrence as potentially a major
step forward and conservative interest groups highlighting Lawrence as po-
tentially a major step backward and the next step toward “far more con-
troversial issues like same-sex marriage.”135 It would have been hard to
focus on discrete elements of the opinion by the Court and tune out the
pre-decision and post-decision framing of the case.
And so one study found that Lawrence polarized opinion on the
Court more than a series of other recent and important decisions.136 Our
survey design was intended to replicate the surrounding atmospherics of
a high-salience Court decision, with similar results. In the Gay Marriage
Conditions, before the Court or Congress acted, the positions of the op-
posing sides were presented. Subjects were told that “[g]ay rights groups
have argued that the Constitution prohibits governments from treating
gay marriage differently” and “opponents have argued that the
Constitution only protects traditional marriages and families.”137 In re-
sponse to Court or congressional action, these perspectives were
presented again, as the conditions stated that “[g]ay rights groups praised
the new decision as a ‘major step forwards in the history of American civil
132. 539 U.S. at 564 (“We conclude the case should be resolved by determining
whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise
of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.”); see also Yoshino, supra note 126, at 793 (citing this as example of strategy R
that “stresses the interests we have in common as human beings rather than the
demographic differences that drive us apart”).
133. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve . . . whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter.”).
134. Yoshino, supra note 126, at 778. R
135. Klarman, supra note 28, at 459. R
136. Egan & Citrin, supra note 88, at 5. R
137. See infra Appendix B.
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rights and a vindication of the Constitution’” and opponents were noted
as “criticiz[ing] the decision as a ‘blow to the people and traditions of the
United States and to the importance of the institution of traditional mar-
riage.’”138 Our results showing the significance of priors could be be-
cause of these polarizing atmospherics.
Another reason why affirmation might be difficult is that the Court
decision need not just affirm and dignify existing biases in preferences,
but respond to greater biases in preferences created by the Court in these
high-salience cases. Our results found that Court decisions on gay mar-
riage and gun rights polarized sentiments on the underlying policy issues
in statistically significant ways: Support for gay marriage after a Court de-
cision on gay marriage increased among egalitarian-communitarians, and
decreased among hierarchical-individualists. Support for gun rights after
a Court decision on gun rights increased among hierarchical-
individualists and decreased among egalitarian-communitarians.
ii. Entitativity to Make the Court for Everyone: Breaking Down
Constitutional Walls. — If affirmation might not work as well in high-sali-
ence cases, what are we to do? One response is easy: nothing, and we
should not see this as a matter of concern. There are no clear right or
wrong answers in these cases, or at least no clear right or wrong factual
presuppositions. The concern about cultural bias is most convincing
when there is evidence that it prevents individuals from responding to
accurate factual information.139 But we have no reliable way to assess
whether the Court, as an objective factual matter, is more or less capable
than Congress in deciding these issues. These are less clearly factual is-
sues in which bias might distract us from factual truths.
Compliance with Court decisions is also not really an issue. All of the
research suggests that the Court enjoys over 80% support for its basic
constitutional powers.140 Having a constitutional system in which the oc-
casional, high-salience battle leads our priors to affect how we think
about what the Court should do is not necessarily problematic in the first
place. It can be argued that it is precisely because of support for the
Court that it can and should handle these sorts of conflicts where pas-
sions are most intense and most biased.141 In diverse societies, there will
be issues that divide us, even if not many. For those issues, rather than
138. See infra Appendix B.
139. See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 Nature 296, 297 (2010)
[hereinafter Kahan, Communications Failure] (“If we want democratic policy-making to be
backed by the best available science, we need a theory of risk communication that takes full
account of the effects of culture on our decision-making.”).
140. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring
Attitudes Towards the United States Supreme Court, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 354, 355 (2003)
[hereinafter Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes] (describing survey results in which 30% of
those surveyed indicated “great deal” of confidence and 50% of those surveyed indicated
“only some” confidence in individuals running Supreme Court).
141. See Eskridge, supra note 30, at 1294 (stating role of Court is to keep “the stakes of R
politics . . . reasonably low”).
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trying to overcome division, better to manage them in tolerable ways.
Having the more popular institution (the Court) decide these cases is an
acceptable panacea.
But why tolerate polarizing disagreement when there might be some-
thing we can do about it? We propose that talking about the Court differ-
ently might mitigate some of the dynamics discussed earlier. The scholar-
ship about finding common ground is really of two forms: findings that
affirmation can help142 and findings that self-awareness about bias can
help.143
However, the public rhetoric that discusses the Court makes the situ-
ation worse. This is for two related and reinforcing reasons. First, our
discussion of the Court assumes and reiterates the sense of two separate,
distinct perspectives on the Constitution, with each side refusing to ac-
knowledge any flaws in their positions (“entitativity” is what the literature
calls this sense of separate and discrete groups with their own self-psychol-
ogy). Second, this discussion proceeds in the face of a Court that is re-
ified and revered rather than challenged, limiting the challenges posed
to either group perspective. We propose, instead, self-identifying flaws in
our own perspectives on the Court, and opening the Court up to genuine
discussions to further this more open discussion. This strategy has the
potential to open our constitutional minds.
Let us start with the notion of “naı¨ve realism.” Naı¨ve realism refers to
our tendency to see others as hopelessly biased (“realism”), but see our-
selves as objective (“naı¨ve”).144 This relies on an in-group and out-group
dynamic. One’s own group (the in-group) is not biased but others (the
out-group) are biased. Naı¨ve realism is even greater among groups with a
higher degree of entitativity, or the “extent to which a social aggregate is
or is not perceived as a coherent, unified, and meaningful entity.”145 The
more we see ourselves as part of one group—and others as part of an-
other group—the more we expect those groups to demonstrate “more
142. See Hirt & Markman, supra note 127, at 1069 (“Previous research has suggested R
that an effective strategy for debiasing judgments is to have participants ‘consider the
opposite.’”).
143. See Scott O. Lilienfeld, Rachel Ammirati & Kristin Landfield, Giving Debiasing
Away: Can Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human
Welfare?, 4 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 390, 393 (2009) (summarizing research on debiasing
and its efficacy).
144. Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, Naı¨ve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for
Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in Values and Knowledge 103, 110–11 (Edward S.
Reed, Elliot Turiel & Terrance Brown eds., 1996).
145. Vincent Yzerbyt, Olivier Corneille & Claudia Estrada, The Interplay of Subjective
Essentialism and Entitativity in the Formation of Stereotypes, 5 Personality & Soc. Psychol.
Rev. 141, 141 (2001).
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similarity.”146 We therefore perceive our in-group and the out-group both
as having “coherence and unity.”147
The problem with this is the mental shortcut it creates: if you are in
my group you are open and reasonable, whereas if you are in the other
group you are “fixed and unreasonable.”148 If you are an egalitarian-
communitarian, you look for others who are egalitarian-communitarians,
identify with them, support their decisions, and consider them fair, even
while you think that hierarchical-individualists are a coherent and unfair
community.
These features of group-ness plague our modern discussion about
the role of the Court. Members of the public see decisions of the Court as
based on considerations other than objective determinations of the law,
particularly when that decision is disagreeable.149 But our public discus-
sions of the Court do not acknowledge this fact, and instead feature
heuristics meant to communicate to each Justice’s community that they
are being objective even as others are being biased. Chief Justice Roberts
stated at his confirmation hearings that he aspires to be an “umpire” to
indicate in language resonating with hierarchical-individualists that he
was being fair.150 Justice Scalia talks about originalism as the “law of
rules”151 while attacking liberal judges as stating that “[i]f it is good, it is
so.”152 Justice Sotomayor testified in language resonating more with
egalitarian-communitarians—“‘as a judge, I don’t make law.’”153 Justice
Brennan described the emergence of a conservative-leaning originalism
as “little more than arrogance cloaked as humility.”154
There are therefore competing perspectives, each labeling their own
approach fair and foolproof and the other approach biased and fool-
hardy. Our results, suggest, though, that this language is just hiding our
146. Vincent Yzerbyt, Anouk Rogier & Susan T. Fiske, Group Entitativity and Social
Attribution: On Translating Situational Constraints into Stereotypes, 24 Personality & Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 1089, 1091 (1998).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1099 (citing studies illuminating common heuristic of interpreting in-
group members as reasonable and out-group as less reasonable).
149. See John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 928, 937–38 (2000) [hereinafter Scheb &
Lyons, Myth of Legality] (describing “widespread recognition of the effect of the justices’
ideologies on their decisions”).
150. Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 Const.
Comment. 701, 701 (2007).
151. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1187
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law].
152. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 39
(1997).
153. Naftali Bendavid, Supreme Strategy: Stick to the Script, Wall St. J. (July 15, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124762632993643211.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
154. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 435 (1986).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-4\COL401.txt unknown Seq: 48  3-MAY-12 9:13
778 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:731
bias rather than resolving it. Both sides decide whether the Court should
decide a case based on their cultural priors. But each side discusses its
own view of the Court as obvious and neutral.
At the same time, because it is the Supreme Court, full of highly
qualified elites wearing robes, the Court itself is seen as beyond reproach.
A substantial body of research shows that the public believes that the
Court behaves differently from the political branches.155 The general ten-
dency of coherent groups not to self-criticize and thereby open minds is
worsened because the entire field of constitutional law and the Supreme
Court is seen as more off limits for critique. The result is that even
though our cultural priors do affect us, the combination of our attach-
ment to a view of the Constitution stated unconditionally by some sides
and reticence to attack the Court at all, makes our bias worse rather than
better.
Affirmation, as mentioned earlier, is one common strategy of dealing
with these dynamics. But affirmation requires recognition of the
worldviews of others.156 This can occur, but is hard to achieve when the
stakes are so high, when those having to reach across the aisle are se-
lected because they have strong precommitments, and when the intrusive
deliberative strategies that accomplish this best are hard to apply on the
scale of three hundred million.
We suggest something more modest: recognition of the complica-
tions of the worldviews of ourselves, and the cultural openness that results.
Forcing people to acknowledge the flaws in their own perspectives has a
powerful mind-opening effect.157 In discussing the Court, though, it is
hard to recognize the flaws of a position unless the flaws with the entire
group and series of positions associated with the group are recognized.
The way to do this is by focusing on the complications of the worldviews
of the group to which one subscribes. This might be considered a strategy
of minimizing group-ness, or lowering entitativity.
We can imagine several tactics to lower entitativity when it comes to
the Court. Issuing decisions at the same time with competing messages
can lower entitativity (releasing opinions on the same day with different
155. See John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion:
Popular Expectations Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23
Pol. Behav. 181, 190 (2001) (“Americans may be realistic about the actual determinants of
Supreme Court decision making, but they continue to believe in the ideal of the apolitical
Court.”); Scheb & Lyons, Myth of Legality, supra note 149, at 938 (“Politicians who might R
be tempted to attack the Court run the risk of offending those who subscribe to the myth
of legality.”).
156. See Amy McQueen & William M.P. Klein, Experimental Manipulations of Self-
Affirmation: A Systematic Review, 5 Self & Identity 289, 303 (2006) (discussing relationship
between social comparisons and self-affirmation).
157. This is a version of a call for judicial humility. See Kahan, Neutral Principles,
supra note 98, at 62 n.347 (describing humility as “consciousness of one’s own limits”). Our R
focus here is on recognizing one’s limitations by breaking down group identities and
discussing the Court differently.
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outcomes and different alignments of Justices, for instance). The Court,
the Justices, and the media can highlight instances where Justices vote
contrary to expectations—when Justice Alito cites Justice Breyer’s concur-
ring opinion in support of his dissenting opinion in Snyder v. Phelps,158 or
Justice Scalia votes to strike down a key Bush Administration initiative on
the war on terror in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.159 If the Court, the Justices, and
others focus on how even their philosophy could have led to a different
result, it can reduce entitativity.
Once entitativity is lowered, it is easier for the public to recognize
the biases inherent in the perspectives of their group, and therefore in
themselves. They no longer see their group as natural and inevitable and
so they no longer see their group (and their) perspective as natural and
inevitable. Remedying bias can therefore become an automatic, self-
enforcing psychological feature of responses to the Court. Highlighting
bias through “basic education about specific cognitive biases . . . de-
creases participants’ tendency to fall prey to certain errors.”160
Once these biases are identified to members of the public, it then
creates an implicit motivation to control prejudice.161 Research has
demonstrated that our biases are often “outside of conscious aware-
ness”162 and that many individuals want to control those prejudices.163
Studies have discovered that highlighting this bias to individuals can have
longitudinal effects; it helps create a “negative attitude toward
prejudice . . . and an implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced,”164 causing
that person to battle that bias on their own in the future. If the Court and
the public see that being an originalist or a pragmatist might bias their
perspective and struggle to fight against this, it can result in “extended
practice in non-stereotypic responding . . . capable of reducing the subse-
quent activation of stereotypes”165 and creating an “automatic goal to re-
spond in an unbiased manner.”166 Just like affiliating with a group and
158. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1226 (2011).
159. 542 U.S. 507, 554–79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 143, at 393. R
161. See generally Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control
Prejudice, 44 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 164 (2008) (discussing phenomenon).
162. Id. at 164.
163. See Russell H. Fazio, Joni R. Jackson, Bridget C. Dunton & Carol J. Williams,
Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona
Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1013, 1022–23, 1025 (1995) (“[T]he
expression of judgments and the performance of overt behavior may be carefully and
deliberately monitored [by test subjects] so as to avoid the appearance of a prejudiced
response.”).
164. Glaser & Knowles, supra note 161, at 165 (emphasis omitted). R
165. Bertram Gawronski, Roland Deutsch, Sawsan Mbirkou, Beate Seibt & Fritz
Strack, When “Just Say No” Is Not Enough: Affirmation Versus Negation Training and the
Reduction of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 44 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 370, 370
(2008).
166. Id. at 375.
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using the biased perception provided by that group were activated auto-
matically, so too can using unbiased perspectives.167
Breaking down the bias that derives from group identities would only
be furthered by highlighting the imperfections of the institution at the
center of all of this: the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court
need not be treated in a tabloid fashion to be treated in a more candid
and honest fashion. Easing the discourse norms about the Court to per-
mit more direct conversation about the Court would increase less-biased
conversation. From recognizing our own perspective is biased, to recog-
nizing that the institution itself is imperfect, our awareness of bias would
grow and therefore so would our motivations to mitigate it.
Some might object to our debiasing through self-awareness on the
grounds that it weakens both the rule-of-law and the rule-of-the-Court.
Recognizing that the groups are not fixed can force Justices to recognize
the ambiguities in their jurisprudential commitments, which can make
the Justices even more unaccountable by opening their eyes to the discre-
tion they have.168 But if silence on these factors causes people to hide and
therefore further bias, the alternative is even worse. Recognizing ambigu-
ity causes people to confront it and confront the biases they use to resolve
ambiguity. Hiding ambiguity permits people to use their biases to resolve
it.
Those worried about the Court might balk that this strategy is lower-
ing the Court to the level of every other institution, and making it into a
junior varsity Congress or White House. If we recognize that originalism
or pragmatism have their limitations, and we recognize that the Court
itself has its limitations, what is there to stop other institutional actors or
the public from ignoring powerless men and women in robes? The Court
goes out of its way in “obfuscating the judicial role” in order to preserve
its legitimacy because of this sense.169 There is much research to suggest,
though, that the Court starts from a deeper base of legitimacy in the first
place.170 Moreover, bringing competing jurisprudential groups and the
Court down to Earth could make it subject to the same forms of accounta-
bility that other institutions endure. Our results suggest that if the Court
does right by someone, that person will like the Court. And so as long as
167. See id. at 370 (“[A] more effective means to change unwanted stereotyping is to
combat the automatic activation of stereotypes in the first place rather than to deliberately
control their influence on behavior once . . . activated.”).
168. See Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1945, 1948 (1991) (“The
point here is simply that some constraint in the law is beneficial, and the more rigid
formulation offers more constraint on the judge than the more flexible and discretionary
formulation.”).
169. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change,
and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1958 (2006).
170. See Jeffrey J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public
Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. Pol. 1114, 1115 (1997) (“[A]n active and even
controversial Court can enjoy strong, stable aggregate support.”).
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the Court does right by enough people, it will be fine. This seems accept-
able for a democratic society.
c. A Strategic Court. — Most accounts of the behavior of the Supreme
Court now are either explicit or implicit in seeing the Court as calibrating
its actions based on the behavior of other actors.171 From this perspective,
our results suggest that the Court is not constrained in the way that tradi-
tional theories of backlash postulate, though there is still cause for cir-
cumspection. Because people respond to the cultural message of the case
in deciding which institution should decide the case, it means that the
Court will essentially always have some sizeable percentage of the popula-
tion supporting its authority to decide a case. At the same time, because
people respond to the cultural message of a case, for high-salience cases
there will be a sizeable percentage of the population opposed to the
Court deciding the case and beyond persuasion. This combination pro-
vides the Court with a plausible “run to the base” strategy in high-salience
cases and a plausible strategy to secure universal support in low-salience
cases. The Court can ignore opponents in high-salience cases at minimal
cost, and in other cases it can use strategies to persuade potential
opponents.
Our results do suggest, though, that a Court deciding in favor of gay
marriage or similar issues might have more to fear than a Court deciding
in favor of gun rights or similar issues because of greater voter turnout by
hierarchical-individualists. A Court deciding any issue, of course, must
keep in mind that measuring opinion about the Court does not perfectly
capture dynamics, because more powerful and more entrepreneurial in-
dividuals might be especially angered even if median opinion is not.
For salient issues, the strategic logic is simple: A decision motivates
the base and does not convince those it never could have convinced any-
way. Regardless of how the Court decides the case (and assuming there
are at least some cultural communities supporting the decision), there
will be substantial support for the notion that it was the right institution
to decide the case.
But a Court decision does more than that: For salient issues, it uni-
fies and (usually) motivates those supportive of the cultural perspective
the Court articulated. In the Gay Marriage Condition, for instance, sup-
port for the Court deciding the case among egalitarian-communitarians
increases. Egalitarian-communitarians are also much more likely to sup-
port gay marriage. For the strategic Court, the reliability and even in-
creased support of the base provides the “political support” necessary to
help it withstand any controversy it engenders by issuing a particular deci-
sion. A motivated base can prevent many of the threats the Court faces
171. See Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 601, 611 (2000) (noting broad
support for proposition that justices act “strategically, in the sense of understanding and
anticipating the likely responses of others to the judge’s own actions”).
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(constitutional amendments, new and threatening Justices) simply by the
use of a minority veto.172
At the same time, in high-salience cases there is little chance the
Court can convince opponents. When the Court rules in favor of gay mar-
riage, hierarchical-individualists are less likely to support the Court decid-
ing constitutional cases. When the Court rules in favor of gun rights,
egalitarian-communitarians become less likely to support the Court. Op-
ponents become even more implacably opposed to the underlying consti-
tutional issue.
In other words, the Court motivates its supporters and loses support
among those who would not have supported it anyway. The only risk the
Court faces with opponents is that it slightly increases their turnout with-
out a compensating increase by supporters (in fact, supporters are less
likely to turn out to vote in three of the conditions while opponents are
more likely to vote).
But the Court can endure any slightly greater chance for body blows
it might face because of slightly increasing opposition turnout. We know
that, regardless of institutional preferences, many studies have shown that
even in the face of unhappiness with the Court there is very little support
for “fundamental structural changes” to the Court.173 Around 80% of the
public has “a great deal” or “only some” confidence in “the people run-
ning” the Supreme Court.174 Even in an era of political polarization,
these numbers persist.175 A Court decision might cause electoral trends
undermining the decision, but at least part of that impact will be miti-
gated by the support opponents of the decision have for the basic struc-
ture of the Court.
An important caveat should be mentioned here: We are measuring
public opinion, and public opinion does not always translate into identi-
cal political dynamics. It could be that among the few egalitarian-
communitarians opposed to the Court deciding cases, there is a particu-
larly potent or resourceful group of individuals who could trigger a back-
lash cascade. This might be so, for instance, because the decision moti-
vates a geographically concentrated group of people.176 At the very least,
172. See generally Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy:
The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History (2007)
(discussing political supports as improving or harming power of Court).
173. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 635, 649 (1992) (noting diffuse support for Supreme
Court remains high among those who support institutional purpose, regardless of support
for specific Court decisions).
174. James L. Gibson et. al., Measuring Attitudes, supra note 140, at 355. R
175. See James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized
Polity, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 507, 521 (2007) (showing continued support of Court
over time despite increased political polarization).
176. There is research suggesting local public opinion in response to a Court decision
might be different than national public opinion. See generally Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey
A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb’s
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this worry is minimized because of the smaller number of outcome-
independent individuals who object to the Court.
The situation facing a pro-egalitarian-communitarian strategic Court
is slightly less positive than the situation facing a pro-hierarchical-
individualist strategic Court. After the Warren Court, liberals started to
develop a real concern over backlash. Nowhere was this truer than the
scholarly reaction to Roe, because of concern that “backlash against Roe
might swell to engulf the entire liberal agenda.”177 As a result,
“[c]onstitutional scholarship that cautions judges to interpret the Consti-
tution so as to avoid controversy [has arisen] particularly on the left.”178
Even scholars favoring a liberal Court commonly express fear at the pros-
pect of the public reaction that such a Court might face.179
Our results show that these groups (which tend to be cultural
egalitarian-communitarians) have many reasons to be supportive of a
Court issuing decisions they like. Across a range of issues related to insti-
tutional competence, egalitarian-communitarians trusted the competency
of the Court more than Congress. This support for the Court endures
more for egalitarian-communitarians than for hierarchical-individualists.
There is not a perfect match between their favored issues and those of
liberals, but there is a meaningful overlap. In other words, the Court has
more support from its supporters initially, and that support is more likely
to endure. When given the stimulus of a pro-gay-marriage Court decision,
as mentioned before, egalitarian-communitarians become much more
supportive of the power of the Court and of gay marriage itself.
The complication for the Court in this situation is that there is sup-
port for the concern that there would be a strong backlash by opponents.
Hierarchical-individualists become even less supportive of the Court de-
ciding cases, and less supportive of gay marriage, when the Court rules in
favor of gay marriage. These effects are largely cancelled out by the in-
crease in support by egalitarian-communitarians. The only clear negative
from our results is electoral turnout: When the Court rules in favor of gay
marriage, egalitarian-communitarians are less likely to vote while
hierarchical-individualists are more likely to vote. An egalitarian-
communitarian Court might convince natural supporters even more, and
for the most part the outrage of natural and inevitable opponents could
be endured, but results at the ballot box might undermine all of this with
time.
Chapel, 58 J. Pol. 1079 (1996) (discussing effect on constituency involved in Lamb’s Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)); Valerie J. Hoekstra, The
Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89 (2000) (comparing
impact of specific cases on local communities implicated and population at large).
177. Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 407. R
178. Id. at 406.
179. See, e.g., id. at 374 (“Stunned by the ferocity of the conservative counterattack,
progressives have concluded that the best tactic is to take no action that might provoke
populist resentments.”).
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For a hierarchical-individualist Court, the dynamics are somewhat
different. When the Court issued decisions that they liked, hierarchical-
individualists moved dramatically in favor of the Court. In fact, the only
way for a Court to attract the support of these communities is to have the
Court decide cases in their favor.
Hierarchical-individualists become no more supportive of the consti-
tutional right to carry a concealed weapon, but that is because it would be
nearly impossible to be more supportive—their levels of support were al-
ready incredibly high. Curiously, when the Court decides in favor of gun
rights the decision motivates turnout for hierarchical-individualists more
while depressing turnout for egalitarian-communitarians.
2. Congress. — Popular constitutionalism has emerged in part be-
cause of a response to the institutional exclusivity of judicial supremacy,
and, in some of its (more departmentalist) versions, has focused on em-
powering other institutions,180 including Congress. Congress does not
usually play a substantial role either in the actual deliberation about con-
stitutional issues or the scholarly discussion of judicial review.181 Indeed,
Justice Scalia has argued that the failures of Congress to consider consti-
tutional limitations might merit revisiting the presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of congressional laws.182 Our results suggest that
Congress might be able to act more on constitutional issues.
Before turning to new opportunities for Congress, we will first dis-
cuss general concerns similar to those highlighted about the Court ear-
lier. If outcome-independent institutional preferences exist only in the-
ory, what constrains Congress from overstepping its constitutional
boundaries? While backlash was a self-enforcing constraint on the Court,
there is less of a need for institutional preferences to constrain Congress,
because members of Congress face elections.183 Congress also battles with
the President for control of the coercive power of the federal govern-
ment.184 If Congress exceeds its prerogatives, then the classic Madisonian
ambition-counteracting-ambition logic will constrain Congress.
180. See David Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 2047, 2063 (2010) (“Departmentalism refers to the idea that the coordinate branches
of government possess independent authority to interpret the Constitution.”).
181. See Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 241, 243
(1993) (noting small role Congress plays in constitutional law).
182. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, Nat’l J., June 10, 2000, at 1810, 1811
(quoting Justice Scalia as stating, in regards to presumed constitutionality of congressional
acts, “ ‘[I]f Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with
and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution . . . then perhaps that
presumption is unwarranted.’”).
183. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”);
id. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years . . . .”).
184. See, e.g., Thomas O. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the
Separation of Powers, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 679, 718 (1993) (“After all, ongoing checks
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What, then, of the concern highlighted earlier about cultural priors
biasing our responses to institutions, in this case, Congress? Again, parti-
ality might be even less of a concern when Congress acts, because by its
(electoral) nature we might expect partiality. If we aspire to overcome
bias, many of the same debiasing techniques mentioned earlier would
work.
If members of Congress want to assume a larger role in constitu-
tional law, our results suggest the public will not object. There is no hege-
monic public support for judicial supremacy as many, in the absence of
evidence, have assumed.185 There is a strong norm and practice against
Congress pushing challenges to the Court’s constitutional interpretations
very hard.186 When Congress pushes back, members of the Court com-
plain.187 Perhaps as a result of a shared conception of role-appropriate
behavior, Congress does not often challenge the Court’s role in deciding
major constitutional cases, or at least stops at the water’s edge.
Our results suggest that Congress can act to challenge the interpre-
tive exclusivity of the Court. The same dynamic of a safe and even ener-
gized base applies in the Congress conditions, but perhaps with even
greater force because of differences in how the Court and Congress oper-
ate. In our study, when Congress decides an issue it increases its support
for deciding the issue among its supporters. For Congress, though, the
support of the base is even more important because of the political dy-
namics of Congress. Part of the reason for the polarization of Congress is
the greater accountability of its members to the base of each party.188
Political primaries for House and Senate elections mean that a member
of Congress must achieve support from a sufficient number of party loyal-
and balances between the legislative and executive branches are themselves a source of
political accountability.”).
185. See Anthony Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23 (reporting
“widely held public and legal view” in favor of judicial supremacy); see also supra notes
24–33 and accompanying text (detailing negative views of judicial activism). R
186. There have been many discussions in Congress of disagreements with the
decisions of the Court, and even thousands of pieces of introduced legislation to remedy
this disagreement. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895,
896 (1984) (“Jurisdiction-curbing proposals have surfaced in Congress in virtually every
period of controversial federal court decisions.”).
187. See, e.g., Ruth Walker, O’Connor Assails “Pervasive Attacks” on Judges and
Judicial Independence, Harv. L. Sch. (Feb. 2007), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/
today/hlt_feb07_oconnor.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“In her remarks . . .
O’Connor . . . decried an atmosphere of growing hostility toward the judiciary ‘in the halls
of Congress’ . . . citing recent threats by some members of Congress to impeach judges
whose rulings refer to decisions by courts abroad.”).
188. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2330–47 (2006) (explaining that party system creates incentive for
party-alignment and therefore polarization).
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ists to be nominated.189 Districts for the House are drawn increasingly so
that party loyalists are more likely to be clustered, in part because of re-
districting changes190 and in part because of increasing tendencies of like
people to live by like people.191 Party loyalists are more likely to contrib-
ute money to campaigns and to work on behalf of a campaign.192
In other words, there is reason to think Congress could become
more involved in deciding constitutional issues if it wanted to do so. It
might be that the “people have largely abdicated their collective authority
to determine constitutional meaning.”193 But this is not because the peo-
ple wanted this to be so. If popular constitutionalism wants to mobilize
around an institutional home, Congress would be a plausible place to
start.
There are several caveats or limitations about this potentially more
assertive role for Congress. Our survey did not measure whether this
might pose some longitudinal threats to Congress (what Part II discussed
as the “too much N” problem). The support for the Court is much higher
than for Congress,194 and the Court enjoys a “positivity bias,” meaning
the more people see the Court the more they like it,195 while the opposite
is true of Congress.196 There is not much direct research about what tran-
spires if these two institutions engage in direct combat over authority to
decide constitutional issues, but these repeatedly validated findings might
cause Congress concern. This suggests hesitations about our findings, or
at the least hesitations about relying on these findings to initiate frequent
constitutional actions by Congress in the face of disagreement by the
Court.
189. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in
American Politics, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 415, 424 (2004) (describing role of primaries in
increasing party polarization).
190. See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 114–15 (2004)
(“Gerrymandered election districts, which pack voters with similar preferences into safe
districts, produce representatives who reflect more partisan extremes.”).
191. See generally Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded
America Is Tearing Us Apart (2008).
192. See Stephen A. Jessee, Voter Ideology and Candidate Positioning in the 2008
Presidential Election, 38 Am. Pol. Res. 195, 206 (2010) (“[C]ampaign donations,
volunteering, or other sources of assistance tend to come from more ideologically extreme
voters.”).
193. Pozen, supra note 180, at 2054.
194. See Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, supra note 24, at 67–72 (explaining relative R
approval of Court compared to Congress).
195. See Gibson & Caldeira, Citizens, supra note 25, at 3 (“According to this theory R
[of positivity bias] . . . anything that causes people to pay attention to the court . . . winds
up reinforcing institutional legitimacy . . . .”).
196. See Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, supra note 24, at 67–70 (describing pattern that R
approval of Congress decreases as public sees more of it).
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B. Extra-Institutional Actors in Constitutional Law
There is now significant scholarship addressing how social move-
ments use constitutional law as a means of pushing their own agendas.
But this scholarship has an increasingly singular focus: examining how
the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court derive from constitu-
tional arguments advocated by movements outside of the courts. Social
movements are the demand side, and the Court is the supply side. So
while this scholarship is seen as focusing on the efforts of “the people
themselves”197 as opposed to the traditional “obsession”198 with courts,
instead it combines the two, focusing on how “the people themselves” use
the courts.
But while social movements looking to influence constitutional law
might have singular goals, they do not have a singular choice at their
disposal. These social movements can pursue their causes in a range of
institutional places. This is the question of institutional choice, and it has
loomed large for many social movements over the years. President
Obama has criticized the civil rights movement for focusing too much on
the courts, stating that one of the problems with the civil rights move-
ment is that it became too “court-focused.”199 Mark Tushnet has made a
similar point, arguing, “[l]iberals today seem to have a deep-rooted fear
of voting. They are more enthusiastic about judicial review than recent
experience justifies, because they are afraid of what the people will
do.”200 The gay rights movement has engaged in exhaustive discussions
of whether to push their cause in the courts or in the legislature. Now,
with a Republican majority in the House of Representatives and a base
eager to overturn the health care law, these issues have become front-
page headlines: Was it right to turn to the Court to overturn the health
care law?
Our results can shed some light on these questions. More than any-
thing, our results suggest that it does not matter whether one goes to
Congress or to the Court. Regardless of whether a movement goes to
Congress or to the Court, supporters of the eventual decision by that in-
stitution will think the movement chose correctly, and opponents will
think the movement chose poorly. Likewise, going to Congress or the
Court will increase support for the eventual constitutional issue among
those pleased with the result, and decrease support for those unhappy
with the result. If an organization supports gay marriage, in other words,
a win in the Court will mean that supporters will think it was right to take
197. See generally Kramer, supra note 19 (discussing how “the people themselves” R
were responsible for creating, interpreting, and implementing United States Constitution).
198. See Friedman, Birth, supra note 8, at 155 (describing academia’s “obsession” R
with countermajoritarian democracy).
199. Justin Driver, Obama’s Law, New Republic, June 30, 2011, at 12.
200. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 177; see also Obama, supra note 6, at 83 (stating he R
“wondered if, in our reliance on the courts to vindicate not only our rights but also our
values, progressives had lost too much faith in democracy”).
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the case to the Court, and opponents will not. And it means that support-
ers will become even more supportive of gay marriage, while opponents
even less supportive.
There are a few limitations on these points about institutional
choice. First, the Court does polarize policy preferences more than
Congress does across all conditions. If a movement aims to keep different
cultural communities closer together, Congress might be a better place to
advocate its cause.
Second, the Court affects electoral turnout differently than Congress
does. Going to the Court (at least in three of our four conditions) can
mobilize hierarchical-individualists and demobilize egalitarian-
communitarians in a way that going to Congress might not. In other
words, by bringing the health care law challenge to the Court,
hierarchical-individualists might benefit at the polls, while egalitarian-
communitarians might suffer. If the California gay marriage case makes
its way to the Court, there is reason to believe gay marriage supporters
will have less turnout and opponents will have greater turnout.
Other research suggests that differences more in the nature of the
cultural-political dynamics generated by institutional differences should
influence institutional choice. The sheer chance of success in one institu-
tion compared to another becomes relevant. Is there a reason to go to
the Court because it might be “acting when elected officials won’t”?201 Is
it important to entice elites to join the movement cause, and is it the
case—as it commonly is—that judicial success impresses elites?202 Will the
Court have difficulties implementing its decisions compared to Congress?
Are there path-dependent benefits to having the Court go first and fram-
ing the ambition of the social movement as a constitutional one rather
than as a political one?203 These are important questions to be asked, but
they are questions more about the politics of institutional choice than the
pure preferences surrounding it.
Our results can provide insights for another group of extra-
institutional actors thinking about institutional choice: constitutional the-
orists. Constitutional theory has been dominated by what Robert Post and
Reva Siegel called “backlash theorists” who have remained “fearful [of]
an assertive judiciary” and what that assertive judiciary might do to foster
201. See Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil
Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 483, 483 (2003)
(discussing ways federal courts might and do exercise more power when Congress fails to
do so).
202. See Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A
Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in Cause Lawyering:
Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 261, 264–66 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (describing ways in which elites get involved in causes).
203. For a discussion of this dynamic, see generally Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization
as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity, 96 Am. J.
Soc. 1201 (1991).
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public rebellion against the Court.204 After a more aggressive conserva-
tive jurisprudence, now some conservatives likewise fear that public reac-
tion to cases like Heller mean that even with a conservative Court “[t]he
largest threat to liberty still lies in handing our democratic destiny to the
courts.”205 This fear of the Court doing too much and of finding a theory
to justify the Court acting like “the least dangerous branch”206 has cre-
ated a cottage industry of rebuttal scholarship, but scholarship accepting
the debate on its own terms. The “democratic constitutionalism” advo-
cated by Post and Siegel sees the public response to the Court as not
threatening, but still distinctive.207 So, too, do some see the Court as
uniquely situated to pursue certain causes because the Court is seen as
largely immune from the dynamics of public opinion.208
We are suggesting something different, but with implications for
these constitutional theorists. On many fronts, our results suggest that the
public responds to the Court playing a central role no differently than it
responds to other institutions. The Court does polarize policy and electo-
ral preferences more than Congress, but the larger questions of whether
the Court should be deciding cases in the first place are addressed by the
public using largely the same heuristics the public uses to decide whether
Congress should be taking action. The Court is not more distinctively
threatening to a cause, nor is it distinctively helpful. The public responds
to the Court using their cultural priors in many of the same ways they
respond to Congress.
This suggests a simple point for constitutional theory: It is time to
reorient at least some parts of our discussion about the role of the
Court.209 The proper role for the Court in a democratic society is an
important one, to be sure. If the goal of constitutional theory is to answer
the most important questions of the day, then part of our discussion
about backlash has been answering the wrong questions about the role of
the Court.
204. Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 373. R
205. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
Va. L. Rev. 253, 257 (2009).
206. See generally Bickel, supra note 2. R
207. See Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 376–77 (“We argue that each of these R
[backlash] theorists tends in his own way to overestimate the costs of backlash and to
underestimate its benefits. Contemporary scholarly debate does not sufficiently appreciate
the ways that citizen engagement in constitutional conflict may contribute to social
cohesion in a normatively heterogeneous polity.”).
208. See Schauer, supra note 86, at 9 (“The Court . . . operates at a distance from the R
center of gravity of the nation’s policy portfolio . . . .”).
209. For a related point, see Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and
the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 933, 933 (2001) (arguing
scholars should stop focusing on countermajoritarian difficulty because other political
elements of judicial review are more important).
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CONCLUSION
In the last years of his life, Thurgood Marshall often reflected back
on his career before joining the Supreme Court. Marshall had been at
the middle of one of the most important institutional choices made in
American constitutional history: pursuing racial justice through the
courts and the Supreme Court as much as—if not more than—through
the other branches.210 This leads to the obvious question: The institu-
tional choice he made was important, but was it also right?
For decades, this has been one of the defining questions about
Brown, and about constitutional law more generally. It is a retrospective
question of interest, and a prospective question of importance. Where do
advocates of gay marriage or of gun rights go in pursuit of their vision of
justice? This conversation has been simultaneously profound and incom-
plete. Our goal has been to shed some light on the answer to the question
that Justice Marshall posed, even if just for now and not for his genera-
tion. We hope our results will be of use to scholars writing about the
Court and lawyers deciding how to get justice for their clients.
210. For a summary of these strategic decisions by Marshall and his colleagues, see
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black
America’s Struggle for Equality 53–79 (2004).
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APPENDIX A: ARTICLES IN CONDITIONS
Major Victory for Gun Rights Groups: Supreme Court Issues Decision Protecting
Gun Owners
In recent weeks, gun rights groups have been arguing to a federal
court that the federal and state governments must protect the ability of
gun owners to carry a concealed weapon. Gun rights groups have argued
that the right to carry a concealed weapon for self-defense is protected by
the Constitution, and the Supreme Court should issue a decision enforc-
ing that constitutional right. In response, opponents have argued that the
spread of concealed weapons would decrease the safety of citizens and
federal and state governments need to be able to regulate that, and that
therefore such a right to carry a concealed weapon is not addressed by
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held oral arguments on gun rights, which were
presented by the lawyers for gun rights and by the lawyers for those op-
posing gun rights. After these arguments were presented to the Court,
the members of the Court engaged in private discussions about the case
for several months.
Just a few days ago, the Supreme Court decided the case—and gun
rights groups are very pleased. The new decision requires federal and
state governments to protect gun owners carrying a concealed weapon.
Gun rights groups praised the new decision as a “major step forwards in
the history of American freedom and a vindication of the Constitution”
while gun control groups criticized the decision as a “blow to the safety
and security of the American people and their communities.”
Major Victory for Gun Rights Groups: Congress Passes Law Protecting Gun
Owners
In recent weeks, gun rights groups have been pushing Congress to
pass a law requiring federal and state governments to protect the ability
of gun owners to carry a concealed weapon. Gun rights groups have ar-
gued that the right to carry a concealed weapon for self-defense is pro-
tected by the Constitution, and Congress should pass a law enforcing that
constitutional right. In response, opponents have argued that the spread
of concealed weapons would decrease the safety of citizens and federal
and state governments need to be able to regulate that, and that there-
fore such a right to carry a concealed weapon is not addressed by the
Constitution.
Members of Congress met with representatives from affected com-
munities about this issue, and several committees of Congress held public
hearings on gun rights. Members of Congress traveling home to their
congressional districts to campaign for the next election have also sched-
uled town hall meetings to discuss these issues with their constituents.
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Just a few days ago, Congress passed official legislation related to gun
rights—and gun rights groups are very pleased. The new law requires fed-
eral and state governments to protect gun owners carrying a concealed
weapon. Gun rights groups praised the new legislation as a “major step
forwards in the history of American freedom and a vindication of the
Constitution” while gun control groups criticized the legislation as a
“blow to the safety and security of the American people and their
communities.”
Major Victory for Gay Rights Groups: Supreme Court Issues Decision Protecting
Gay Marriage
In recent weeks, gay rights groups have been arguing to a federal
court that the federal government and state governments permit gay
couples to marry, and now have taken their case to the Supreme Court.
Gay rights groups have argued that the Constitution prohibits govern-
ments from treating gay marriage differently than traditional marriage
between spouses of the opposite sex and the Supreme Court should issue
a decision enforcing that right. In response, opponents have argued that
the Constitution only protects traditional marriages and families, and
that whether to protect gay marriage is not at all addressed by the
Constitution, so such a Supreme Court decision protecting gay marriage
would be unwise.
The Supreme Court held oral arguments on gay marriage, which
were presented by the lawyers for gay rights groups and by the lawyers for
those opposing gay marriage. After these arguments were presented to
the Court, the members of the Court engaged in private discussions
about the case for several months.
Just a few days ago, the Supreme Court decided the case—and gay
rights groups are very pleased. The new decision requires federal and
state governments to permit gay couples to marry. Gay rights groups
praised the new decision as a “major step forwards in the history of
American civil rights and a vindication of the Constitution” while oppo-
nents criticized the decision as a “blow to the people and traditions of the
United States and to the importance of the institution of traditional
marriage.”
Major Victory for Gay Rights Groups: Congress Passes Law Protecting Gay
Marriage
In recent weeks, gay rights advocates have been pushing Congress to
pass a law requiring that the federal government and state governments
permit gay couples to marry. Gay rights groups have argued that the
Constitution prohibits governments from treating gay marriage differ-
ently than traditional marriage between spouses of the opposite sex and
Congress should pass a law enforcing that constitutional right. In re-
sponse, opponents have argued that the Constitution only protects tradi-
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tional marriages and families, so such congressional legislation protecting
gay marriage would be unwise.
Members of Congress met with representatives from affected com-
munities about this issue, and several committees of Congress held public
hearings on gay marriage. Members of Congress traveling home to their
congressional districts to campaign for the next election have also sched-
uled town hall meetings to discuss these issues with their constituents.
Just a few days ago, Congress passed official legislation related to gay
marriage—and gay rights groups are very pleased. The new law requires
federal and state governments to permit gay couples to marry. Gay rights
groups praised the new legislation as a “major step forwards in the history
of American civil rights and a vindication of the Constitution” while op-
ponents criticized the legislation as a “blow to the people and traditions
of the United States and to the importance of the institution of tradi-
tional marriage.”
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People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals
go in making decisions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disa-
gree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disa-
gree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]
The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from
hurting themselves.
It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from
themselves.
The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if
that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make
so they don’t get in the way of what’s good for society.
B. Hierarchy-Egalitarianism
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and dis-
crimination. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these
statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree,
slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more
equal.
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and
the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.
Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in
our society.
It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don’t
want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.
Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.
Political Knowledge Module
Next we’d like you to identify various persons, groups, or events that
have been in the news recently. There is a 30 second time limitation on
each question.
Which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of
Representatives? [Democrats, Republicans, Neither]
211. Question module orders were randomized.
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Which party currently has the most Senators in the U.S. Senate?
[Democrats, Republicans, Neither]
What public office is now held by Timothy Geithner? [Speaker of the
House, Senate Majority Leader, Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury,
Supreme Court Justice]
What public office is now held by Harry Reid? [Secretary of State,
Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, Vice President, Supreme
Court Justice]
What public office is now held by John Roberts? [Speaker of the
House, Senate Majority Leader, Vice President, Attorney General,
Supreme Court Justice]
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to
override a presidential veto? [Bare majority, Two-thirds majority, Three-
fourths majority]
Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the federal courts?
[The President, Congress, The Supreme Court]
How long is the term of office for a United States Senator? [Two
years, Four years, Five years, Six years]
Which party would you say is more conservative than the other at the
national level? [Democrats, Republicans, Neither]
Salience Module
Now we’d like to get your reaction to where you think this issue fits
within our current political climate.
How important is the issue of gun rights or gun control to you per-
sonally? [Very important, Moderately important, Mildly important, Not at
all important]
How closely do you follow the debate over gun rights and gun con-
trol? [Very closely, Somewhat, Very little, Not at all]
Gay Policy Preference Module
Now we’d like to get your reaction to some of the things that people
have said on this issue. [Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Slightly
Disagree, Slightly Agree, Moderately Agree, Strongly Agree]
The Constitution prohibits the government from treating gay mar-
riage differently than heterosexual marriage.
The Constitution allows the government to prohibit gay marriage.
Permitting gays and lesbians to marry will allow more Americans to
enter into and benefit from loving and committed relationships.
Allowing gays and lesbians to marry will undermine traditional mar-
riage and undermine American families.
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Gun Policy Preference Module
Now we’d like to get your reaction to some of the things that people
have said on this issue. [Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Slightly
Disagree, Slightly Agree, Moderately Agree, Strongly Agree]
The government is prohibited from regulating or banning concealed
weapons by the Constitution.
The government is permitted to regulate or ban concealed weapons
under the Constitution.
Prohibiting the use of concealed weapons makes it hard for ordinary
citizens to defend themselves.
Prohibiting the use of concealed weapons helps increase the safety
and security of ordinary citizens.
Dependent Variables
Institutional Preference Module
When legislatures decide controversial issues like these, there is
more legitimacy to their decision because we want elected legislators
rather than unelected and activist judges running the country.
When courts decide important issues like these, there is more legiti-
macy to the decision because judges are not beholden to the political
wheeling and dealing of lobbyists in the way that legislators are.
With politically controversial issues like this, the legislature will bet-
ter understand how far rights extend in a given setting.
With questions of fundamental rights like this, we should not leave
the determination of rights to the vagaries of the legislative process.
The legislature should decide issues like these because they are less
likely to be influenced by high-powered lawyers who don’t have the pub-
lic’s best interest at heart.
Courts should decide issues like these because they are less likely to
be corrupted by political groups that want to distort the facts and the law.
Voting Intention Module
Now we’d like to know how you feel about the upcoming federal
congressional elections. We know it’s still early, but we’d like to know
which way you are leaning right now.
If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party’s
candidate would you be more likely to vote for in your congressional dis-
trict? [Strongly/Moderately/Slightly lean towards the Democratic/
Republican Party]
How likely are you to vote in the upcoming federal congressional
elections in November? [Very likely, Likely, Unlikely, Very unlikely, I have
already voted this election cycle with an early or absentee ballot]
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APPENDIX C: TABLES AND MEASURES
Model 1 Model 2
beta t beta t
e.factor −0.46 −11.36 −0.35 −6.05
i.factor 0.35 7.92 0.31 6.29
party 0.02 0.72
ideology 0.11 2.39
(Intercept) −0.03 −0.75 −0.47 −3.13
Residual standard Residual standard
error: 0.73 on 371 error: 0.7176 on 332
DOF Adjusted R- DOF Adjusted R-
squared: 0.36 F- squared: 0.38 F-
statistic: 107.3 on 2 statistic: 54.02 on 4
and 371 DF, p-value: and 332 DF, p-value:
< 2.2e-16 < 2.2e-16
Table 1: Multivariate regression analysis of cultural values, party affilia-
tion, ideological self-identification, and support for gun rights. N = 350.
Predictors are un-standardized regression coefficients with t-statistic indi-
cated parenthetically. Outcome variable is standardized (z-score) scale of
items in “pro.gun.rights” scale. Missing values for individual cultural
worldview items were replaced using multiple imputation.
Model 1 Model 2











Table 2: Univariate and multivariate regression analysis of institu-
tional preference and beliefs and institutional competence. N = 2000.
Predictors are un-standardized regression coefficients with t-statistic indi-
cated parenthetically. Outcome variable is standardized (z-score) re-
sponses to “institutional.beliefs”. Missing values for individual cultural
worldview items were replaced using multiple imputation. Note that the
addition of additional variables generates no significant increase in vari-
ance explained in institutional preferences.
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Model 1 Model 2
egalitarianism 0.25 (5.27) −0.14 (−0.90)
individualism −0.10 (−2.03) 0.12 (0.91)
court 0.15 (2.48) −0.15 (−0.89)
Pk 0.10 (1.44) 0.06 (0.34)







constant −0.09 (−2.14) −0.11 (−0.92)
Residual SE: 0.84 on Residual SE 0.8259 on
756 DF Adjusted R- 750 DF Multiple R-
squared: 0.12 F- squared: 0.1705, F-
statistic: 22.38 on 5 statistic: 14.02 on 11
and 756 DF P-value: < and 750 DF P-value: <
2.2e-16 2.2e-16
Table 3: Multivariate regression of effects of cultural values on beliefs about insti-
tutional competence across pro-gay conditions. N=800. Predictors are un-stan-
dardized regression coefficients with t-statistic indicated parenthetically. Modera-
tor variable is standardized (z-score) “political knowledge” scale. Outcome
variable is standardized (z-score) “institutional.beliefs” scale. Missing values for
individual cultural worldview items were replaced using multiple imputation
(Rubin 2004; Royston 2004).
Model 1 Model 2
hierarchy-egalitarianism 0.50 12.22 −0.51 −12.84
communitarian-individualist −0.15 −3.45 0.36 8.25
court −0.04 −0.80 0.03 0.66
congress −0.06 −1.06 0.04 0.70
h-e:court 0.14 2.39 −0.05 −0.92
h-e:congress 0.12 2.10 −0.01 −0.23
c-i:court 0.00 −0.02 0.05 0.83
c-i:congress 0.09 1.48 0.06 1.00
constant 0.03 0.69 −0.03 −0.85
RSE: 0.71 on 1183 RSE: 0.73 on 1095
DF Adjusted R- DF Adjusted R-
squared: 0.44 F- squared: 0.37 F-
statistic: 116.1 on 8 statistic: 81.43 on 8
and 1183 DF, p- and 1095 DF, p-
value: < 2.2e-16 value: < 2.2e-16
Table 4: Multivariate regression of effects of cultural values and condition on
support for gay marriage (Model 1) and support for concealed carry (Model 2).
N=1200. Predictors are un-standardized regression coefficients with t-statistic in-
dicated parenthetically. Missing values for individual cultural worldview items
were replaced using multiple imputation.
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Model 1 Model 2
hierarchy-egalitarianism 0.15 (1.32) 0.15 (1.32)
communitarian-individualist 0.29 (2.40) 0.29 (2.40)
Court −0.02 (−0.14) −0.01 (−0.06)
Congress −0.03 (−0.24) 0.10 (0.68)
h-e:court −0.25 (−1.54) −0.31 (−1.82)
h-e:congress −0.26 (−1.64) −0.20 (−1.21)
c-i:court 0.00 (0.03) 0.12 (0.65)
c-i:congress −0.02 (−0.12) −0.06 (−0.36)
Constant 0.52 (4.88) 0.52 (4.88)
ND: 1639 on 1234 ND: 1512 on 1146
DF RD: 1617 on DF RD: 1486 on
1226 DF (3 obs 1138 DF (4 obs
deleted due to deleted due to
missingness) AIC: missingness) AIC:
1635 1504
Table 5: Ordered logistic regression of effects of cultural values on likeli-
hood of voting across control, pro-gay (Model 1) and pro-gun (Model 2)
conditions. N=800. Predictors are un-standardized regression coefficients
with t-statistic indicated parenthetically. Moderator variable is standard-
ized (z-score) “political knowledge” scale. Outcome variable is
“likely.voter”. Missing values for individual cultural worldview items were
replaced using multiple imputation.
